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TOWARD A THEORY OF RIGHTS FOR THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION
Robert Brousseau*
INTRODUCTION

I.

Recent cases' from the several comers of labor law leave the impression that there exists in this important branch of the law some confusion
as to the nature of the rights and obligations which it treats. There is a
clear tendency to deal with the myriad cases ad hoc, in accordance with
principles and prejudices drawn from the general jurisprudence rather
than under the influence of some overarching conception of the regulation
of the employment relation. It is no innovation to remark that we are all
the products of our long history. Tradition is our great teacher and our
guide: without it we should be lost. As Borges has said in the literary
context, there is no attractiveness in originality in a literal sense, for it
means simply rootlessness. But tradition can fetter us, indeed mislead us.
In fact, the traditions of the law are many and to speak of them as one is
an evil this article seeks to avoid, indeed to rectify.
It is my argument that much thinking in the area of labor law has been
grafted upon an individualistic stock where it ought not grow; in fact, the
considerations embodied in that diverse corpus we call labor law draw
heavily upon a tradition of collective jurisprudence, and it is in collective
terms that we ought to seek the solution of concrete cases. I shall attempt
first to demonstrate the disarray in the treatment of labor rights, to show
the origins of the conflict between collective and individualistic traditions, and then to propose a mode of analysis for the reconciliation of
competing employment values. Finally, I shall show how the system thus
developed fits into the mainstream of labor adjudication, drawing illustrations from the National Labor Relations Board -and the courts.
II.

THE DILEMMA EXPOSED

I have selected a series of cases which demonstrate the web of inconsistencies which has developed due to the absence of any clearly understood
theory of labor rights. The cases fall under four main headings: first,
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; B.S.F.S., 1969, Georgetown
University; J.D., 1972, Duke University; LL.M., 1977, Columbia University.
1. See Parts l and lV infra.
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those in which the employer confronts the individual employee; second,
disputes over communicational rights; third, employer countermeasures
to employee activity; and fourth, disputes as to such subjects of social
legislation as assurance of a minimum wage, safety or freedom from
illicit discrimination. Together they are meant to illustrate, not exhaust,
the difficulties in analysis and adjudication under the current, largely unarticulated, conception of labor rights. I shall address them briefly here,
and return after a full development of a theory useful to their resolution to
discuss them in detail.
A.

Employer-Employee Confrontation

The story of Blue Flash Express, Inc. 2 is one long taught in the law
schools, but one that happily is waning in impact. 3 The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, 4 and that
representative, under section 9 of the Act is the one "designated or selected . . . by the majority of the employees. .

..

-5

Moreover, it is

illegal for the employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]. .... ,,6 How does
the employer determine if a union indeed represents a majority, for absent
such majority status the employer has no obligation to treat with it? Indeed, it would be a violation of the same Act for him to recognize a minority union as the exclusive representative of his workers. 7 The most
obvious way is simply to ask individual employees whether they had
joined the union. The National Labor Relations Board initially took the
position that this practice constituted per se coercive employer conduct
illegally interfering with protected section 7 rights, thus recognizing the
justifiability of employees' fear when questioned about union affiliation.
"The employee who is interrogated concerning matters which are his
sole concern is reasonably led to believe that his employer not only wants
2. 109N.L.R.B.591,34L.R.R.M. 1384(1954).
3. See Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974) and text accompanying notes 139-43
infra.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (1976).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the ight to refrain from any and all of such activities. . ..
7. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). Section
8(a)(2) of the Act provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
Of course, "members only" recognition of a minority union is permitted under the Act. There, the
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information on the nature and extent of his union interests and activities
but also contemplates some form of reprisal once the information is obtained. The finger which espionage might merely direct to him is actually
pointed at him by the inquiry from his employer. He fears that a refusal to
' 8
answer or a truthful answer may cost him his job.
This sensible position, nonetheless, was overruled by the Board in Blue
Flash. The company, having received a letter from the union requesting
recognition as the majority representative, systematically interrogated all
its employees as to their union affiliation. Its general manager, Golden,
summoned the employees singly into his office. In effect he told them that
he was indifferent as to their union membership but that he wished to
know their status so that he might know how to respond to the union's
recognition letter. Each employee denied to Golden that he had signed
any union card, although in fact, every one of them had done so. The
Board majority responded to these facts as follows:
"[T]here is no credible evidence that the Respondent at any time made
any threats . . . , resorted to any reprisals, or exhibited any antiunion
animus. Although the employees who had signed union authorization
cards gave false answers to Golden's inquiries, the Respondent did nothing to afford them a reasonable basis for believing that the Respondent
might resort to reprisals because of their union membership or activity. "9
The Board's narrow focus upon the employer's conduct, however,
leaves unanswered a question which the facts present and which demands
a response: why did they all lie? Had the company somehow hired uniformly mendacious employees? That is an unlikely answer, and so there
must be a more satisfactory explanation for the apparent malocclusion
between the rationale pronounced and the behavior observed. Regrettably, the Board did not provide one. If behavior is the datum of a social
science, then a theory must be found to explain it. It does no good to
propound legal principles which on their face are irreconcilable with observed fact.
Another sort of employer-employee confrontation is exemplifed by
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.10 It is unfortunately not easy to introduce
the unfamiliar reader to the complexities of Weingarten, for it is but the
employer deals with the union not as the exclusive representative of all unit employees, but merely as
the spokesman for its members. Retail Clerks Local 128 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17
(1962).
8. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1361, 24 L.R.R.M. 1575, 1576 (1949)
(footnote omitted). This opinion drolly quotes, at id., Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and
the Wagner Act, 20 TUL. L. REv. 469,499 (1946): ". . . because of the widespread feeling that all
employers hate unions, the employee does not expect his admission of union activity or membership
to be used as a basis for promoting him or voluntarily giving him a raise."
9. 109 N.L.R.B. at 592,34 L.R.R.M. at 1385(1954).
10. 420U.S. 251 (1975).
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last act in a drama which has been running for years, with the Board, the
courts of appeals, and many unions and employers in the cast. Leura Collins was reported by a fellow employee to have purchased a $2.95 box of
chicken but to have placed only $1.00 in the register. Store detective
Hardy summoned Collins and questioned her concerning the chicken. At
several points during the questioning, Collins in vain asked the store manager, who was also present, to call the union shop steward or some union
representative to the interview. Hardy soon discovered Collins was in fact
telling the truth and had taken but $1.00 worth of chicken, and he apologized. The beleaguered Collins then burst into tears and cried that the
only thing she had ever gotten from the store without paying for it was her
free lunch. This intrigued Hardy and the store manager a great deal, as
they assumed free lunches were against company policy. They thereupon
closely interrogated Collins about her alleged violations of the assumed
company rule, with Collins repeating her request that a shop steward be
called to the interview. Again, her request was denied. Further investigation showed that Collins was in the right, that store custom was to provide
free lunches to employees and that headquarters had never communicated
any prohibition against it. Leura Collins reported the details of the interview fully to her shop steward and a charge of an unfair labor practice
was filed against Weingarten, the employer, for denying her requests for
union representation. II
The Board agreed with Collins and her union and the Supreme Court
sustained the Board's position. But observe how the Court arrived at this
not unreasonable result:
The Board's construction that § 7 creates a statutory right in an employee
to refuse to submit without union representation to an interview which he
reasonably fears may result in his discipline was announced in . . .Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 ...
First, the right inheres in § 7's guarantee of the right of employees to act
in concert for mutual aid and protection.
Second, the fight arises only in situations where the employee requests
representation. In other words, the employee may forego his guaranteed
right and, if he prefers, participate in an interview unaccompanied by his
union representative.
Third, the employee's right to request representation as a condition of
participation in an interview is limited to situations where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action. 12
This is odd language indeed. The Court suggests that the fight to repre11. The summary of the facts is taken from the majority opinion. See id. at 254-55.
12. Id. at 256-57 (emphasis added except for words "First," "Second," and "Third") (footnote omitted).
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sentation depends on the reasonableness of the employee's fear of punishment. Paradoxically, the Court in the same opinion gives us language
which is formalistically reconcilable but in fact completely inconsistent
with this notion of reasonable fear: "A single employee confronted by an
employer investigating whether certain conduct deserves discipline may
be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors."1 3 Evidently there is a
fastidiously precise threshhold of fear, which, becoming "reasonable,"
renders one "too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident
being investigated," thus triggering a section 7 right in the employee. 14
And yet we are told that this ignorant, fearful and inarticulate employee
may intelligently and effectively waive this right. This is not merely paradoxical, it is absurd. Again we confront legal precepts which seem at
odds with industrial reality, and reality, whether good or ill, is not easily
pronounced wrong. Because the right in Weingarten is created ad hoc
without a theoretical matrix to understand it, it can scarcely satisfy.
B.

CommunicationalRights

Employees, it is said, have certain communicational rights in the workplace, guaranteed by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, rights
which came before the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Magnavox Co.15 The
facts are tidy and the opinion terse, but there is much there to mull over.
In 1954, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers became the collective bargaining representative of Magnavox's employees and executed a labor agreement with the company including in it
clauses which, as implemented, prohibited employees from distributing
literature even in nonworking areas during nonworking time. 16 The
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, observed obiter that the
prohibition violated the important section 7 right of employees to "form,
17
join, or assist labor organizations" or "to refrain" from such activities.
While the importance of communicational rights at the workplace-the
right of workers to discuss other rights in the area of common meeting
and collective concern-was emphasized by the Court, whether the contractual prohibition which the union now sought to change was in viola18
tion of section 7's communicatory rights was not before the justices.
13. Id. at 262-63.
14. See note 6 supra.
15. 415 U.S. 322(1974).
16. Id. at323.
17. Id. at 324.
18. Id. at 323-25 (citing with approval the Board's Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 53
L.R.R.M. 1242 (1963) (a waiver case); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183
(1943); and its own Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)).
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"The sole issue concerns the power of the collective-bargaining representative to waive those rights." 1 9 In short, the Court said the union had no
power to waive these section 7 rights, although the power of a union to
20
waive so fundamental a right as the right to strike is easily accepted.
How is this paradox to be resolved? Where lies the distinction between
the nonwaivability of the modest right to handbill on one's working premises and the waivability of the elemental labor right to strike? Absent
some articulation of a theory of rights, the readers of this case are at a loss
to derive any usefully broader principle from it than its narrow holding. If
law is to be at all predictive, we are entitled to more.
C. Employer Responses to ConcertedActivity
There is a decision of the Board the difficulty of which is not displayed
by the simplicity of its teaching: that a union, in negotiating in good faith
a strike settlement agreement, may substantially curtail an employee's
preferential recall rights, or Laidlaw rights, assured under theretofore
unquestioned interpretations of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 2 1 After all,
reasoned the Board in United Aircraft Corp., 22 if management may unilaterally preclude reemployment of economic strikers for legitimate and
substantial business reasons, then certainly reinstatement claims may be
adjusted by mutual accord of management and the union. 23 The paradox
of this particular decision is this: If section 8(a)(3) is designed to insulate
the individual employee from employer discrimination against him for having asserted his rights (here, to strike) under the NLRA, which is the
common understanding, 24 it seems irrelevant that the union concurs in the
discrimination. Certainly no parallel precept exists in the law of race dis19. 415 U.S. at 325.
20. Id. See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1248-49, 53
L.R.R.M. 1242, 1243 (1963).
21. In The Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969). cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), the Board held that:
[E]conomic strikers who unconditionally apply for reinstatement at a time when their positions
are filled by permanent replacements: (1)remain employees; and (2) are entitled to full reinstatement upon the departure of replacements unless they have in the meantime acquired regular and
substantially equivalent employment, or the employer can sustain his burden of proof that the
failure to offer full reinstatement was for legitimate and substantial business reasons.
171 N.L.R.B. at 1369-70. Moreover, the employer has an affirmative duty to seek out the former
strikers when the conditions of (2) are met. Id. at 1369. See generally Finkin, The Truncation of
Laidlaw Rights by Collective Agreement, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 591 (1980).

22.
23.
24.

192 N.L.R.B. 382. 77 L.R.R.M. 1785 (1971).
Id. at 386,77 L.R.R.M. at 1791.
See text accompanying notes 161-72 infra.
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crimination. 25 Moreover, there is a strong textual argument against the
UnitedAircraft result, since section 8(b)(2) of the same Act makes it unlawful for a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of [section 8] (a)(3) .... "26
Hence it is lawful to do together that which is unlawful if done by either.
Here the dilemma seems to be not so much a misalignment of theory with
behavior, but the use of a legal duty to enforce a social desideratum to
which it is unrelated, or more properly noncorrelative. Because the courts
have no theory of rights for labor law, the correlative uses of the concept
of duty fail as well.
D. Labor StandardsandEqual Employment Opportunity
Four cases in the area of social legislation also demonstrate the need for
of labor rights. Two involve racial discrimination and two intheory
a
volve minimum wage or overtime claims.
Harrell Alexander, a black man and a drill operator in the employ of
Gardner-Denver Co., was fired, ostensibly for producing too many defective or unusable parts. 27 The collective agreement between his union and
his employer provided that "[n]o employee will be discharged, suspended or given a written warning notice except for just cause," and that
"there shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry. "28 Alexander filed
a grievance pursuant to a clause covering "differences . . . as to the
meaning and application of the provisions of [the] Agreement" and "any
trouble aris[ing] in the plant.' '29 His grievance was simply that "I feel I
have been unjustly discharged and ask that I be reinstated with full seniority and pay,''30 although it was later modified to assert a claim of
improper racial motivation. At the arbitration hearing, Alexander testified
that his discharge was the result of racial discrimination, but the arbitrator
sustained the company's action. Alexander subsequently filed a private
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,31 alleging that his
discharge was a racially discriminatory employment practice. The com25.
26.
27.

See, e.g., Papermakers, Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
29U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
The facts are taken from the opinion of the Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415

U.S. 36,38 (1974).
28. Id. at 39.

29. Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 39.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Alexander had filed an administrative charge with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission (which referred it to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission),
after his grievance but before the arbitration hearing. 415 U.S. at 42.
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pany pleaded the arbitral award as a bar to Alexander's private action,
and the trial court entered a dismissal subsequently affirmed by the court
33
of appeals. 32 The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
reversed. Title VII, the Court said, "concerns not majoritarian processes,
but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities. Title VII's
strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each
employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights
conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose
behind Title VII. . . . The actual submission of petitioner's grievance
to arbitration . . . does not alter the situation." 34
Decided the following term, however, Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Organization,35 took a less sweeping view
of the right to be free of racial discrimination. In that case, the company
and union were parties to a contract prohibiting racial discrimination; in
fact, the union was actively pursuing complaints of racial discrimination
and had appointed a special investigating committee, prepared reports,
and convened special meetings with the employer, the employer's collective bargaining association, the California Fair Employment Practices
Committee and an antipoverty agency. When the grievances came to arbitration, two employees, Hollins and Hawkins, refused to participate, demanding to deal directly with the company president. Soon thereafter
they held a news conference denouncing the employer and engaged in a
consumer picket urging customers not to patronize their employer. They
were fired. The Court, upholding a Board finding of no employer violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 36 stated that the employees' argument that their conduct was protected concerted activity under section 7
"confuse[d] the employees' substantive right to be free of racial discrimination with the procedures available under the NLRA for securing these
rights. . . .[T]hey cannot be pursued at the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA." 37 Contrary to its
language in Gardner-Denver,the Court observed that "the elimination of
discrimination . . . is an appropriate subject of bargaining .... ,,38
Thus the "absolute right" to be free from racial discrimination announced in the first case apparently evaporated in the second.
An employee's right to a minimum wage and overtime pay under the
32.
33.
34.

466 F.2d 1209(10th Cir. 1972).
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id. at 51-52.

35.

420 U.S. 50 (1975).

36.

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).

37. 420 U.S. at69.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
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Fair Labor Standards Act can evaporate, too, unless two opinions from
39
the courts of appeals can be reconciled. In Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
the collective agreement between Mobil and the Oil Workers provided for
wages, paid holidays, and pay for jury duty, military registration examinations and other excused absences. It made no mention of pay during
employee "walkarounds" in connection with OSHA inspections.4 0 The
agreement also contained a typical grievance procedure, leading to binding arbitration. It seems conceded that the scope of the grievance and
arbitration clause 4' was sufficiently broad to permit an arbitrator to determine whether time spent "walking around" with the OSHA inspector
42
was compensable time within the meaning of the collective agreement.
The complaining employees, however, chose to bring suit individually
under the Fair Labor Standards Act for pay due them for hours worked
under that statute. 43 The unsettled question in the case, the court of appeals noted, was "whether an individual employee seeking to assert his
statutory rights under FLSA must exhaust grievance procedure [sic] before seeking judicial resolution."44 It held that he need not.
Conceding the broad presumption in favor of arbitrability created by
the Steelworkers Trilogy4 5 and that the presumption even extended to labor standards disputes,4 6 the court of appeals nonetheless found that the
employee could not be denied his statutory remedy. 47 The court cited Alexander, and found its "underlying rationale" controlling.
Contrast the opinion of another court of appeals in Satterwhite v.
United ParcelService,48 in which the collective agreement contained a
39. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
40. The so-called "walkaround" provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, §
8, 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1976) provides: "Subject to regulations issued by the Secretary, a representative of the employer and a representative authorized by his employees shall be given an opportunity to
accompany the Secretary or his authorized representative during the physical inspection of any work"
place ....
41. This clause read: "Disputes as to the interpretation of or an alleged violation of the application of the terms of the Agreement, or as to working conditions . . . shall be considered a griev"523F.2dat1156n.3.
ance ....
42. The court of appeals expressly declined to resolve the issue, as its decision on the requirement of exhaustion rendered it unnecessary. 523 F.2d at 1159.
43. See 29 U.S.C. §203(o)(1976).
44. 523F.2dat 1155.
45. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
46. 523 F.2d at 1156 (citing Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974)).
47. The court relied on U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971), where the
Supreme Court held that exhaustion of grievance procedures was not required before a seaman might
sue under46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976), regulating the payment of maritime wages.
48. 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). Accord, Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 v. Flagship Hotel Corp., 554 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1977).
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grievance and arbitration procedure similar to the one in Leone. The employer eliminated two fifteen minute coffee breaks and the union grieved.
The arbitrator held that the company could not unilaterally eliminate the
coffee breaks and that the affected employees were entitled to a half hour
of pay for each day worked during the disputed period. The parties jointly
requested a clarification: should the employees be paid the additional half
hour at straight time or at time and a half, for overtime pay? The arbitrator, in what the court of appeals termed a compromise, ruled that straighttime wages be paid. 49 Subsequently, the employees brought suit under
the Fair Labor Standards Act for the overtime pay provided for by that act
for hours worked in excess of forty. The employer pleaded the arbitral
award as a defense, the trial court dismissed, and the court of appeals
affirmed. Observe the effect of this: the employees ended up being paid
one-third less, arguably, than the black letter of the act requires. Have
we, in Professor Cleary's words, turned "pumpkins into coaches and one
man's property into another's" ?50
III.

THE THEORY DEVELOPED

The foregoing procession of cases exposes the problem: if a "right" is
sometimes good and sometimes not, if this "right" may be waived but
another not, then the meaning of rights within the employment relation
becomes obscure and the duties correlative to them equally so. We run,
moreover, the risk of cheapening whatever social and economic values
those rights assume, the values they should assure and preserve. I propose
to develop here at least a prolegomenon to a theory of rights for the employment relation.
A.

The Context of Employment Rights

When we speak of the employment relation, we are speaking of a relation of power. 5 1With few exceptions, this power relation was historically
one-sided. All rights were in the hands of the employer and whatever
rights the employee found himself possessed of, he had by the grace of
his master. The only right which the employee had by virtue of his own
birth and legal position was the coldly analytical right not to work, of
which the correlative was the duty of others to let him starve if, bizarrely,
he should choose to assert the fight. Such a cruel right is not a fight at all,
or one only in the Pickwickian sense. This simple master-servant relation49.
50.
51.

(1972).

10

496 F.2d at 449.
Cleary, ResJudicataReexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 343 (1948).
See 0. KAHN-FREUND, Some Reflections on Law and Power, in LABOUR AND THE LAW I
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ship, sketched quaintly but with heartless effect by Lord Abinger in
Priestly v. Fowler,52 had already begun to pass from the scene before
which our Anglo-American law was unfolding. The chambermaid and the
chilly bed were even then minor characters. The focus of life had shifted
to the railway, the mill, the plant and the colliery, to the worker who
would never know a human employer. Nevertheless, the law of contributory negligence, 53 assumption of risk and fellow servant 54 were late-born
and sired by men who thought of cobblers when they should have thought
of capital. Capital had grouped and regrouped, and massed itself into
power agglomerates, assisted by the law's grant of juristic capacity, in the
form of the corporate personality. "Law has set up moral ideals for business and dressed huge organizations in the clothes of small individu55
als." ,
If the employment relation had always been an uneven power struggle,
it had at least been one between men, and there is a sense of equality, if
only physical or moral, which flows therefrom. Now, however, it was
men, with the simple need to sustain self and family through their finite
days, faced with the corporate employer possessed of relatively infinite
resources and, godlike, of eternal life. If this picture is painted in garish
tones, it is done so because lawyers and judges have in large measure
been exempt from the more obvious forms of subjugation to massed capital. It is true that Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene 56 in 1930 called
attention to it in stark images; Thurman Arnold did so too, 57 if less directly. As a class, however, lawyers little realize the slowness with which
legal institutions permitted massed labor to compete with massed capital,
and the systemic bias operating against such recognition. It took an act
of Congress in 1947-even then a bill designed to curb labor union
52. 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837). The famous quotation of Lord Abinger, portraying the
horrors should the servant prevail at suit, follows:
If the master be liable to the servant in this action, the principle of that liability will be found
to carry us to an alarming extent. . . The master, for example, would be liable to the servant
for the negligence of the chambermaid, for putting him into a damp bed; for that of the
upholsterer, for sending in a crazy bedstead, whereby he was made to fall down while asleep and
injure himself; for the negligence of the cook, in not properly cleaning the copper vessels used in
the kitchen; of the butcher, in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious to the health;
of the builder, for a defect in the foundation of the house, whereby it fell, and injured both the
master and the servant by the ruins.
The inconvenience, not to say the absurdity of these consequences, affords a sufficient argument against the application of this principle to the present case.
Id. at 1032.
53. Commonly attributed in origin to Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
54. Both of these common law defenses are commonly traced to Abinger's judgment in Priestly
v. Fowler. See W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 2-6 (1936); W. MALONE,
M. PLANT & J. LrrrLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 2-3 (1974).
55. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 100 (1935).
56. F. FRANKFURTR & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).

57.

T. ARNOLD, supra note 55.
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excesses-to assure labor organizations juristic capacity in the courts of
58

the United States.
Lawyers and judges will err if they forget two qualities inherent in the
employment relation. First, the law of labor relations is designedly and
necessarily anti-individualistic. The collective interest is made paramount
and seldom should an individual interest be able to outweigh a countervailing one of the labor collective. Second, justifiable employee fear is
the obbligato which plays beneath even the most harmonious of labor relations. Unlike the Japanese and to some extent the Chinese, we have
built our economic system on a foundation largely inimical to job security. Whether one likes it or not, American labor law is a codification of
economic insecurity, of fear. 59 Through the harsh lessons of experience,
laborers as individuals have come justifiably to fear management as a collective. 60 The lion can indeed be made to lie down with the lamb, but
only when the law has acknowledged the justifiability of individual employees' fears and given them the right, even encouraged them, to pool
their efforts as the entrepreneurs do their dollars, to square off as a labor
collective coequal with the capital collective with which it works in the
1
productive enterprise. 6
The American system of labor relations is often spoken of as a legally
sanctioned system of industrial government with its own constitutional,
58. Taft-Hartley Act, tit. 111, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976), provides:
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be
sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United
States.
59. See the opinion by Taft, C.J. in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council. 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921), for an early recognition of this fact. See also F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, supra note 56, at 172-73.

60. Fortunately, in contradistinction to many European and colonial nations, individual relations
are as likely as not to be cordial, for, with exceptions made for our racial past, we lack the bitter class
divisions which so evidently undergird labor relations elsewhere.
61. On balance this seems desirable, or at least as desirable as the traditional historical altemative. Thurman Arnold, however, has aptly noted how we have allowed our institutions to define our
options:
The labor legislation of the New Deal showed the same confused difference [sic: deference?]
to ancient ideals. A man from Mars might be of the opinion that an orderly government should
not permit pitched battles over wages, to the loss and suffering of entire communities, any more
than it would permit public disorder over the payment of debts, or the settlement of any other
civil litigation. However the notion of compulsory arbitration was as uncongenial to labor as it
was to capital. The great labor organizations grew up as fighting and bargaining organizations.
Compulsory arbitration would destroy their purpose by taking away their power to call strikes.
Collective bargaining fits in with the accustomed habit of a series of labor wars and armed
truces, which is the way we think of a dispute over wages as opposed to a dispute over a debt.
Therefore, collective bargaining is the pattern which labor legislation has been compelled to
take.
T. ARNOLD, supra note 55, at 115-16 (emphasis added).
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statutory, customary and adjudicatory law. 62 For all the surface appeal of
treating industrial government as equivalent to political government, the
analogy is an imperfect garment and suffers extended wear unsatisfactorily. There are, to be sure, useful analogies to be made; moreover, it
would meet with universal agreement to state that political government
and industrial government often intersect, that there are dependencies and
interdependencies at play. Industrial government arose in a legal context
in which regulation of the employment relation was assigned by government, consciously or not, to droit privg, to private law, that individualistic reciprocal scheme of enforceable rights and duties of private individuals among themselves, It is our duty to examine to what extent the increasingly public law orientation of employment regulation has affected
the jurisprudential environment of labor law adjudication.
The heated debate which surrounded the ill-fated Labor Reform Bill of
197763 is instructive. It was asserted there, as often it is, that government
is or should be neutral in matters of labor relations, that government favors neither the individual nor labor collective but rather stands apart; and
even that, drawing upon our ancestral heritage, it prizes individualism on
all accounts. Despite the force of this rhetoric, government does neither;
it has on the contrary acted vigorously to disestablish the individualistic
regime of labor rights, and to substitute a collective principle in its stead.
B.

The Chimera of GovernmentalNeutrality

Government, for our purposes, is that organ or congeries of organs
which customarily establishes rules and exacts sanctions within a territorially defined community of persons recognized by individuals both
within and without the territory as entitled so to act. 64 This is the state,
government and sovereignty lumped into one, for the distinctions which
have bedeviled commentators with respect to the nature and origins of
state and sovereignty touch only slightly if at all upon the possibility or
desirability of its neutrality. In the area of labor regulation, it is the posi-

62. See generally Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CAL. L.
REv. 663 (1973); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective BargainingAgreements, 57 MIcH. L. Rev. 1
(1958); Cox, Rights undera LaborAgreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956).
63. See, e.g., LaborReform Act of 1977: Hearingson S. 1883 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 106-17 (1977) (statement of Senator
Tower).
64. So far, I have not strayed far from Kelsen. See H. KE.sEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE 110-22, 207-10 (1945).
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tive law of the government, 65 its voice heard through its legislation, its
executive and administrative acts of regulations, and its judicial dispositions, which are of interest. By positive law, too, I mean law in a sense
wider than that sometimes acknowledged: 66 I do not here debate the necessity of sanction in a legal order, 67 but rather credit with legal significance what others deem only of "moral" stature, that is, the statement of
government made in accordance with the procedure normally invoked for
passage of sanction-bearing enactments. There are statements without ostensible sanction which yet play an active part in the legal system. These
are the "pious utterances" sometimes referred to; to those more favorably inclined toward them, they are the proclamations and preambles said
to put the "moral authority" of the government behind some proposition,
although it is not altogether clear what this means. Kelsen himself more
than once addressed the possibility of "sanctionless" norms, 68 and while
his ultimate position is unclear, to the extent he placed sanctions on a
continuum between "legal" and "transcendental" (essentially reli65. By "positive law" I mean governmentally pronounced law in its broadest sense, which will
be defined momentarily. I use the term simply to distinguish its referent from natural law. moral law,
physical law and the like.
66. That is, I take it in the broadest sense it can bear, limited only by the stricture that it issue
directly from a recognized organ of rulemaking or adjudication acting pursuant to procedures recognized by it and by the governed as usually, if not always and in every detail, entitled to respect and
obedience.
67. See Oberdiek, The Rule of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding Law and Legal Svstems, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 71 (1960). In any event the role of sanction can well be overstressed. There is
much in T. H. Green's observation that the basis of the state is will, not force, a theory I take to be
currently ddmodd. Perhaps the two schools are not so far apart as they appear; in fact, Green remarks:
On the other hand, when the power by which rights are guaranteed is sovereign (as it is desirable that it should be) in the special sense of being maintained by a person or persons, and
wielding coercive force not liable to control by any other human force, it is not this coercive
force that is the important thing about it, or that determines the habitual obedience essential to
the real maintenance of rights. That which determines the habitual obedience is a power residing
in the common will and reason of men, i.e. in the will and reason of men as determined by social
relations, as interested in each other, as acting together for common ends. It is a power which
this universal rational will exercises over the inclinations of the individual, and which only
needs exceptionally to be backed by coercive force.
T. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 103 (1895). See id. at 121-41.

Green's requirement of "habitual obedience" is reconcilable with Kelsen's position although Kelsen
rejects the notion that either a concept of will or one of coercion can be the basis of a state. See H.
KELSEN, THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 61-62, 117, 184-85 (1945); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW
10, 212-13 (1967). See also Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 603 (1958) ("Law is surely not the gunman situation writ large, and legal order is surely
not to be thus simply identified with compulsion.").
68. The social order can, however, even without promise of an advantage in case of obedience, and without threat of a disadvantage in case of disobedience, i.e. without decreeing sanctions, require conduct that appeals directly to the individuals as advantageous, so that the mere
idea of a norm decreeing this behavior suffices as a motive for conduct conforming to the norm.
This type of direct motivation in its full purity is seldom to be met with in social reality.
In the first place, there are hardly any norms whose purport appeals directly to individuals
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gious) 69 sanctions, I should simply place my dividing line slightly beyond
his, maintaining his characterization of "legal" over a greater range of
norms. Some "sanctionless" norms carry the indirect sanction of placing
the person whose conduct is sought to be regulated in a less favorable
legal posture.
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 adjures
that "[e]ach employee shall comply with occupational safety and health
standards and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this
chapter which are applicable to his own actions and conduct.' '70 Failure
of an employee to comply with these voluminous standards leads him to
no pain or penalty, civil or criminal. 7 1 To be sure, the penalty for violation may be discharge by the private employer and the provision accordingly carries a "sanction" in Kelsen's "direct," economic or moral
sense of the word. But to taint the norm as nonlegal because the sanction
is nonlegal is to subvert the ordinary understanding of law. If we say that
this prohibition is not a law, would we say that employee conduct in contravention of it is legal? I suggest not: it is the intent of the provision that
the conduct be deprived of any aura of legality it might otherwise have,
that it be specifically illegal so that an agent who is caught in the act will
be in flagrante delicto.
The law is a complex interrelationship and the characterization of an
act in abstracto as legal, as governmentally favored, may trigger reactions in other relationships different from those which might occur if the
whose conduct they regulate so that the mere idea of them suffices for motivation. Moreover, the
social behavior of individuals is always accompanied by a judgment of value, namely, the idea
that conduct in accordance with the order is "good," whereas that contrary to the order is
"bad." Hence, conformity to the order is usually connected with the approval of one's fellow
men; nonconformity, with their disapproval. The effect of this reaction of the group to the conduct of individuals in accordance or at variance with the order, is that of a sanction of the order.
From a realistic point of view the decisive difference is not between social orders whose efficacy
rests on sanctions and those whose efficacy is not based on sanctions. Every social order is
somehow "sanctioned" by the specific reaction of the community to conduct of its members
corresponding to or at variance with the order. This is also true of highly developed moral systems, which most closely approach the type of direct motivation by sanctionless norms. The
only difference is that certain social orders themselves provide definite sanctions, whereas, in
others, the sanctions consist in the automatic reaction of the community not expressly provided
by the order.
H. KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 15-16 (1945); see H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF
LAW 27-30 (1967).

69.

"The sanctions provided by the social order itself may have a transcendental, that is, a reli-

gious, or a social-immanent character." H. KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 16 (1945).

See H. KELSEN, PtRE THEORY OF LAW 28-30 (1967).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1976).
71. This conclusion must be reached by induction, from reading the penalty provisions in § 17 of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976), which apply to employer violations of these standards and of his
general duty under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976).
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opposite characterization had been attached. 72 Kelsen, speaking of the
United Nations Charter, observed that a "statement has normative character even if it may be used only for the purpose of interpreting other
73
statements having the character of true norms."
Appropriately-proclaimed statements of governmental position may be
of independent legal significance and must be taken into account when
discussing the legal relationships upon which they bear. Governments
take positions and those positions necessarily influence the nature and operation of the legal order. Congress has spoken extensively upon labor
relations; any single normative or sanction-bearing provision of these enactments, stripped of jurisprudential context, may appear nakedly individualistic and devoid of any new teaching as to the one and the many. If
one looks, however, at the whole of its pronouncements, the government
has in this sphere altered the traditional orientation of our legal system
away from the individual and toward the group.
It cannot be gainsaid that the notion of neutral or nonpartisan government has always been an appealing one in history and literature. One cannot but praise the ideal of a government aloof from the petty caprices
which sway men's minds, which stands for principled legislation for the
common weal, for adjudication as unerringly impartial as blindfolded
Justice. However, neutrality as a unitary concept is, like many immediately appealing phenomena, an oversimplification. The hollowness of any
principle of neutrality of government is shown by demonstrating that the
component elements of the concept, neutrality and government, are irreconcilable. There are, perhaps, certain philosophies which stress the minimal or even nonexistent role of government in man's attempt to determine and attain the ends of human existence. Among the ancients are the
Cynic and the Cyrenaic conceptions; yet only the Cynic need detain us,
for the Cyrenaic needed the government to supply the wants necessary to
his good. It is the Cynic of Diogenes, indifferent to the laws and governance of men, and the anarchist among the moderns, hostile rather than
indifferent, who make it uneasy to declare the unanimity of political philosophy that governments are purposive. 74 Unanimity, however, is a
small virtue. Plato, it may quickly be said, would have viewed neutrality

72. Certain legal circumlocutions may attempt this straddling of categorical legality. One "decriminalizes" the possession of marijuana rather than legalizes it. Not dissimilarly, one "deregulates"
the price of natural gas or the pricing of airfares.
73. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 9 (1950).
74. On the Cynic and Cyrenaic views, see W. WINOELBAND, A HISTORY OF PHILosopy 82-87 (2d
ed. 1901).
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of government as folly. 75 Aristotle, too, saw the state as the instrument of
76
the attainment of the ethical weal of the community.
"Nonpartisan" government is worse than a paralogism, for even if it
were logically feasible, it would not be the goal of normal men: it is a
political verbalism which can only confuse. In fact, "governmental nonpartisanship" is itself not a negation of partisanship but rather an affirmation of it by groups traditionally having influence in government, KahnFreund's "bearers of power.'77 In short, I want government to stay out
of my affairs, but not necessarily out of yours. Often, I affirmatively desire governmental- intervention in your affairs, whatever my motives,
pure or grasping. 78 Our word "govern" comes to us from the Latin gubernare, to steer. Etymologically it suggests that all government aims at
directing the corpus politicum and the concerted activities of those within
79
it. It is not by accident that we speak of the ship of state.
How then has the vision of the neutrality of government come down to
us? If one looks at those familiar images of impartiality, of the three Fates
and their anonymous threads, of blind Justice and her anonymous balance, of Solomon and his wise adjudication, the theme is clear. It is not
the purpose which must be impartially arrived at, but rather the means of
execution which we would have impartially applied. Thus while liberals
do their best to prevent the passage of laws deemed beneficial not to their
own interests but to those they identify with conservatives, they do not
think it, without more, wrong that conservatives seek legislatively to impose their own view of things. Members of all factions would, however,
decry any attempt by the government in any of its branches of authority,
once having proclaimed its goals, to seek a broader-or more to the point
of this article, a narrower-application of them by partisan administration or interpretation of the laws. It is this concept of the impartial application of "legitimated partisanship" which is the stuff of the citizen's
75. Id. at 126-27. Plato's blueprint for his highly directive state is found in his THE REPUBLIC.
76. W. WINDELBAND, supranote 74, at 152.
77. See text accompanying note 89 infra.
78. Benjamin Constant did observe:
In the matter of opinion, of beliefs, of insights, there will be complete neutrality on the partof
government, because the government, composed of men of the same nature as those they govern, no longer has anything but incontestable opinions, undoubted beliefs and infallible insights . ..
Such is, I think, the social state toward which the human species is beginning to move. To
attain that social state is the need of, and accordingly will be, the destiny of the epoch. To want
to remain short of it would be unwise; to go beyond it would be premature.
B. CONsTANr, Le Libgralisme, in ADoLPHE Er OEUVRES Cnoisms 243 (1914) (author's translation)
(emphasis added). The remark is utopian by its own terms and a reading of the corpus of Constant's work will show him no exception to my rule.
79. Indeed gubernarewas a nautical term; gubernaculum meant the rudder of a boat.
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desire that his government be neutral: it is at the heart of the notion of
justice, a necessary if not a sufficient condition of the just. Fuller's attempt to give an internal morality to law 80 is an extrapolation from this
basic premise. In denying any role to neutrality of purpose, one need not,
however, deny a large role to principled purpose: any government can
become too partisan. This concession of the desirability of benevolence
of purpose, nonetheless, does not suggest that a government ever can be
relieved of its essential task of goal-directed regulation of human relations. Thus, there are fundamental decisions a government must make: to
take this course of action and improve the lot of the working man, or to
pursue that path and aid the stability of business or capital formation. The
one need not exclude the other: often multiple goals, even apparently conflicting ones, may be served by the same governmental act.
It is the determination of and striving after goals identified at least transitorily as the common weal which is the first principle of government, its
prime duty. Without this purpose, governments should cease to be necessary. But governments are for all practical purposes unwieldy committees
rather than doctrinaire autocrats; they act not out of ignorance of that
which they wish to achieve, but rather out of compromise, resolution or
expediency. Difficulty in the articulation of goals should not be confused
with an absence of them. And in this articulation there is a danger: that
the new will not be seen as new, but simply be construed as a trifling
refinement of the old and the familiar. The systematization of positive law
is necessarily a product of hindsight and there is no Delphi for the inter81
preter of laws.
A conscious realignment of the American legal system's treatment of
the labor combination began early in this century, even drawing on earlier
statutory and industrial experience with the capital combination. These
basic enactments, 82 some simple declarations, others clear commands,
affirmatively endorse the labor combination, create the collective principle and give birth to certain labor rights which we shall later classify as
collective, participatory or individual. All of these acts in some way directly affect employee-employer relations. The Landrum-Griffin Act of
195983 is of a different nature, for it regulates the relation of the individual to his collective, that is, of the member to his union. It is, in fact, the
80. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1964).
81. See Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 320-21 (1978).
82. See generally Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 17, 26 (1976); Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976); Labor Management Relations Act (incorporating, and often referred to as, the National Labor Relations Act). 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-68, 171-88 (1976).
83.

29 U.S.C. § 401 etseq. (1976).
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product of a collective system already established by the earlier legislation.
C.

The Principleof Collective Liberty

A review of the labor enactments of this century reveals a degree of
redundancy uncommon even in legislation. The mere right of labor, however, to collectivize or to "combine" for mutual aid and protection, in
spite of the clear language of the 1914 Clayton Act, 84 was resisted even as
against a willing Congress, by tradition-bound courts. 85 The history of
the right's ultimate legal vindication is well-written elsewhere and there is
no need to repeat it here.8 6 The right to combine is now recognized, but to
state that is to state the obvious. What is more important is the affirmative
shift in the legal context, from an individualistic private law orientation,
to a public law system of conflict adjustment among competing units of
social and economic aggregation. It is now the policy of the United States
to encourage labor collectivization. 87 This is not neutrality in any quoti84. The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations,institutedfor the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)) (emphasis
added).
85. The case which eviscerated the language of the Clayton Act intended to immunize labor
combinations from antitrust attack was, of course, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443 (1921), from which Justice Brandeis dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Clarke and
Holmes. Small wonder as to Holmes, a vox clamantis since his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896): "[T]he organization of the world, now
going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to
set our faces against this tendency." See also F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 56, at
167-76 (1930).
86. See, e.g., R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1-6, 240, 621-24 (1976); C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 95-104 (1961); 18 T. KHEEL,
BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS: LABOR LAW §§ 4.03-.05[4] (1980).
87. This policy was expressed in the Wagner Act of 1935, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976):
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . ..
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury . . . by restoring equality of bargaining
power beween employers and employees.
It is declaredto be thepolicy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice andprocedure of
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dian sense. It is the shift of the focus in which we define liberties, from
the individual to the group. We there see the emergence of collective notions of liberty.
Kahn-Freund illustrated the inevitability of the emergence for the common worker of the principle of collective liberty in the industrial age. The
individual employee, he said, normally has no social power because normally he has no economic bargaining power. 88 Typically the worker as
individual must take what conditions the employer proffers. Hence,
Kahn-Freund asserted that on the labor side, power, if it is to exist, is
necessarily collectivized power:
The individual employer represents an accumulation of material and human
resources, socially speaking the enterprise is itself in this sense a "collective power." If a collection of workers . . . negotiate with an employer,
this is thus a negotiation between collective entitities, both of which are, or
may at least be, bearers of power. But the relation between an employer
and an isolated employee or worker is typically a relation between a bearer
of power and one who is not a bearer ofpower. In its inception it is an act

of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination ....
The main object of labour law has always been, and I venture to say will
always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent . . . in the employment relationship. 89

collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers offull freedom of association.
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. (emphasis added). It was also announced in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, § 2, 29 U.S.C. §
102(1976).
[Tihe public policy of the United States is hereby declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental aulthority for owners ofproperty to organize in the corporate and otherforms ofovnership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions
of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is
necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and
that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . ...
id. (emphasis added).
88. 0. KAHN-FREtUND, supra note 51, at 7-11.
89. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Although I do not believe it diminishes the applicability of the
quoted passage, it should be noted by the American reader that the British have a relation between
collectives which is in more than one reading of the word, foreign to our own. Kahn-Freund elsewhere, in his 1967 Martin Lectures, observed:
A collective agreement can, of course, operate as a legal contract between the parties who
made it, that is, between the union or unions on one side and whoever is the party on the employer's side, whether individual firm or association. A collective agreement can also operate as
an enforceable code for the industry to which it applies so that in one form or another it is law
between individual employers and employees and regulates their individual contracts.
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With these observations Kahn-Freund reminded us that our strongly
individualistic feelings are more troublesome in application than the mere
statement of them might indicate, that individuals are not simply individuals and nothing more, but are parts of social wholes; and that human,
and thus legal, relations, rather than being linear and dualistic are multidimensional and molecular. 90 Charles Frankel explored the subtleties of our
inherited traditions of rights and perceived a tension in another context
which Kahn-Freund observed in the employment relation. Frankel detected a strain in our contemporary legal attitude toward liberty between
rights and liberties of the individual on one hand, and those of social
groups "to maintain the communal life they desire," on the other. 91
Drawing upon Benjamin Constant's perceptive distinction, 92 he identified
a conflict between "the liberty of the ancients," that is, political liberty,
the right to participate in the public power and enforce the collective will,
and "the liberty of the modems," the peaceful enjoyment of private independence. 93 While prizing our legal system's concern with the rights of
the individual as against the group, he nonetheless asked whether there

are not notions of collective liberty, of "men in their capacities as members of groups to make laws for themselves without outside interference-to which our contemporary jurisprudence should give more attention. ",94 No solution entirely on one side or the other, Frankel wrote, will
be satisfactory. "But it is desirable to be aware of the face that the tension
between the One and the Many . . . is not a tension between liberty
Regarding the first, the contractual, effect [the British] situation is interesting. It is almost
universally agreed that in Great Britain collective agreements are not legal contracts, and the
reason which I suggested many years ago and which has been widely accepted is that one of the
essentials of contract making is absent: this is the intention to create legal relations. That intention to create legal relations does not exist although there is nothing to prevent the parties from
making their agreement into a legal contract, and it has happened, for example in the boot and
shoe industry. But this is the exception: the rule is that this is an agreement creating norms of
positive morality, in the language of John Austin, moral obligations but not legal obligations.
This is another part of the heritage of the Industrial Revolution.
0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR LAW: OLD TRADITIONS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 24-25 (1968) (footnotes
omitted). His explanation of this striking difference between American and British labor law was
explored illuminatingly in the first lecture of this volume, where Professor Kahn-Freund demonstrated that while English and American labor relations both involve competing collectives, the
former are more political-economic while the latter are more legal-economic. Id. at 3-28.
90. Professor Cowan has also noted briefly the impropriety of overvaluing individualism in labor
relations. Cowan, GroupInterests, 44 VA. L. REv. 331, 336-38 (1958). See also Blumrosen, Group
Interestsin Labor Law, 13 RuT. L. REv. 432 (1959) (expansion of Cowan's thesis).
91. Frankel, The Jurisprudenceof Liberty, 46 Miss. L.J. 561, 611-13 (1975).
92. See B. CONSTANT, De la libertg des anciens comparge a celle des modernes, in ADOLPHE Er
OEUVRES CHOISIES (1914).
93. Frankel, supranote 91, at 611. See also J. RAwLs, A THEORYOFJusTIcE 201-02 (1971); I.
BE LN, FoUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 124-26 (1969).
94. Frankel, supranote 91, at 612.
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pure, simple, and beautiful one one side and something else which is not
liberty. It is a tension between different liberties. . . . 95
Since true individual liberty in the employment relation results only
when the individual employee is part of a power collective, a "bearer of
power" in Kahn-Freund's words, one may usefully analyze legal relations in the labor sphere in terms of Constant's ancient, or collective liberty, 96 but with certain modifications to assure that its own peculiar dangers (which Constant himself foresaw) will, effectively as possible, be
avoided. Constant described ancient liberty as exercising collectively, but
directly, many of the elements of sovereignty: "to deliberate in public
places, both as to war and to peace, to conclude treaties of alliance with
foreign peoples, to vote the laws, to pronounce judgments, to examine
the accounts, the acts, the conduct of affairs of public officials, to make
them appear before all the populace, to accuse them, to condemn them or
absolve them." 97 And yet alongside this conception of collective liberty,
the ancients would acknowledge "the complete subjugation of the individual to the authority of the whole. "98 "Hence among the ancients, the
individual, sovereign almost habitually in public affairs, was a slave in all
his private relations. As citizen, he decides war and peace; as individual,
he is circumscribed, observed, repressed in all his movements ....
Among the modems, on the other hand, the individual, independent in his
private life, is even in the most free of states, sovereign only in appear95. Id. at612-13.
96. The piece to which Professor Frankel refers is B. CONSTANT, De laliberti des anciens comparee t celle des modernes, in ADOLPHE ET OEUVRES CHOISIEs (1914). The address by Constant was
delivered in 1819.
97. Id. at 159 (author's translation).
98. Id. Constant says "I'assujetissement complet" (author's translation). See also the enlightening treatment by Professor Kahn-Freund which corresponds to his earlier analysis, quoted in text
accompanying note 89 supra:
Countervailing labour power is not synonymous with trade union power, but even if it were, the
problem would be exceedingly complex. Who has the rule-making power and the decision-making power inside the trade union movement and inside a given union? The problem is strictly
analogous to the corresponding problem on the management side. Here, on the union side, we
also have a relation of subordination, of command and obedience, and necessarily so. How far
then, is the subordinationof the individual union member to union'srule and decision-making
power mitigated by his share in the making of these rules and of these decisions? How much
reality is there in the democratic right of members to participate in these processes? . . . A
trade union shares with a company or a government department or a county council the quality
of being a collective unit, and whether the law treats it as a corporate person in the technical
sense is irrelevant in this context. By saying that a collective entity exercises social power you
have said very little until you have also said who (that is which individuals) have that power
inside the collective unit. . . . [Aln analysis of the impact the law has on labour relations is
only a fragment unless it takes into account the internal structures of the trade unions and of the
trade union movement as a whole, . . . between unions and their officers and branches, above
all between unions and their members.
0. KAHN-FRELUND, supra note 51, at I1-12 (emphasis added).
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ance. His sovereignty is confined, almost suspended. . . ."99 Lest Constant sound harsh, one must read on, for it was the purpose of his essay to
show that a unitary conception of the notion of liberty can lead'to the total
suppression of valuable rights; that liberty as a multifarious concept is
susceptible to multifarious threats.
Because individualistic liberty differs from collective liberty, it followed for Constant that it is threatened by a different sort of danger. The
peril of individualistic, or modem, liberty is that in becoming absorbed in
the enjoyment of private independence and in the pursuit of our individual
interests, we shall renounce too easily our right to share in political
power. 100 And conversely, it is the danger of collective liberty that, ever
watchful to assure the sharing of social power, we may sell "too cheaply
individual rights and enjoyments." 101
D.

CollectiveLiberty in the Employment Relation

These words contain a lesson for the employment relation. They are a
statement of the collective principle, the ancient conception of liberty regenerated by economic and industrial necessity in the present age, which
constitutes a change of the focus of liberty from the individual to the
whole, with the added element which Constant saw, the subordination of
the individual to the authority of the whole. Although attacked from time
to time, 10 2 the notion of exclusive majority representation is a necessary
element of a system of collectivity of right, for assertion of individual
right for momentary individual gain will inevitably lead to the weakening Z
and ultimate destruction of the collective and thus to a recurrence of the
naked weakness of the individual employee. It is a primary feature of the
American scheme of labor relations, embodied in section 9(a) of the
NLRA: "Representatives designated . . . for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees . . . shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees .... ",103 As against management
99. B.

CONSTANT, supra note 92, at 159-60 (author's translation).
100. Id. at 162.
101. Id. (author's translation).
102. See, e.g., Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). The section reads:
Representatives designatedor selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining repesentative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collec-
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there is but one voice; as to labor, management has but one ear to lend. 104
The individual, whether supporter or opponent of the labor collective, as
to any relations with his employer, is subsumed to the collective authority
once it is brought into being by majority vote.
Thus, in order to reestablish a degree of equality of position, Congress
has in open and purposive aid of the individual worker established the
collective principle. It has, when he and his peers desire it, absorbed him
into a larger authority and bestowed upon it the prestige of statutory support, just as it had long before permitted the aggregation and corollary
subjugation of individual capital. By its statutes, labor relations have
been cut loose from the individualistic traditions which have anchored
thinking in the area. It is benignly misguided, but irrevocably wrong, to
decide labor relations cases wholly in individualistic terms. It is as foolish, and comes to as sad results, to apply individualistic notions to collective situations as to use trial by ordeal in the conduct of criminal justice.
The collective principle, Constant was wise enough to see, is not antiindividual; it does not care to see the individual crushed beneath huge
powers. 105 Constant saw rather that it is anti-individualistic, which is an
altogether different thing, the indiscriminate sanctification of individual
autonomy in all its manifestations and in every aberrance of occurrence.
One is not faced, as Frankel correctly said, with a question of choosing
between liberty or none, but between kinds of liberties and the means to

tive-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Providedfirther, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court's definitive pronouncement is found in Ji. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,
338 (1944):
But it is urged that some employees may lose by the collective agreement, that an individual
workman may sometimes have, or be capable of getting, better terms than those obtainable by
the group and that his freedom of contract must be respected on that account. . . . The practice
and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages.
104. The situation is slightly more nuanced than that. Professor Summers maintains that the first
proviso to § 9(a) indicates congressional intent to deny to unions the exclusive power to settle grievances arising under collective agreements, Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights under the
Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251. 255-56
(1977), a view he candidly acknowledges is neither the Supreme Court's, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967). nor Professor Cox's, see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV.
601, 621-24 (1956). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 86, at 391-94 (citing Emporium-Capwell Co.
v. Western Addition Comm. Org'n, 420 U.S. 50 (1975)). Both Gorman and Emporium-Capwell are
in accord with Cox's view.
105. Collective power on either side of the employment equation necessitates an opposing collective power for the protection of the individual. A "mixed system," where a collective deals with
an individual, is inherently biased in favor of the collective. This may not be the case where the
individual is himself an equal bearer of power, but that is rarely the case in the employment relation.
Cf. Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 324-26 (1978) (discussion of pressure forces and opposition forces on the scale of a legal system).
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their attainment. 106 Constant saw the key in representation, participation
in the creation, governance and dissolution of the collectivity. There is, to
be sure, a suppressed quid pro quo at work: the individual is subjected to
his collective vis-a-vis strangers to the collective; but within the scheme
of communal liberty, the individual is protected against abuses of his own
community by giving him participatory rights, those rights which Constant listed as so precious to the ancients, and another sort of right, as yet
unnamed.
E. Toward a ClassificationofRights
A summa divisio of rights into "collective" and "individual" has a
surface appeal to recommend it, but it would simply put the question and
would not facilitate solving actual cases. All three of the writers whom I
have presented as admitting certain virtues in collective or communal liberties have recognized the two dangers which Constant made explicit in
his essay. We cannot follow the individualistic course, the liberty of the
modems, for private liberty is a valueless token without political or economic power to match it. That is, in the individual worker's case, seldom
the fact. Nor can we swallow without more the bitter medicine of the
"liberty of the ancients" for we thereby sell too cheaply the worth of the
individual. We must attempt a system of reconciliation and compromise
between these competing liberties, and perhaps foreswear the architechtonic satisfaction of system-building. In Isaiah Berlin's striking phrase we
1 07
must be watchful of the slaughter of individuals on the altars of ideals.
Tentatively, however, we may usefully view rights as collective, participatory or individual. These terms, if as yet without fixed content, have
identifiable contours which will allow us to use them in solving concrete
cases. One cannot enumerate in alphabetical fashion the rights which fall
within each of these three categories, but by way of example and illustration we may hint at their nature and the reader may by analogy himself
08
discover others. 1
1.

Collective versus participatoryrights

The term "collective rights" is not talismanic. Neither is there an a
priori category of rights by essence collective. Rather, collective rights
are those rights, the assertion of which by the individual employee would
be ineffective in the long run to assure meaningful employee influence in
106. Frankel, supranote 91, at 612.
107. I. BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 167(1969).
108. There is no need to apologize for leaving the growth of the law to analogy. It is Edward
Levi's thesis that legal reasoning is essentially analogical rather than inductive or deductive. See E.
LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948). Holmes once remarked: "And is not a princi-
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the conduct of the enterprise and the division of its benefits. They are the
rights which it is necessary to bundle together and vest in a collective
representative, in order that the employment relation may be a relationship between two bearers of power. Because, at least in the working
place, power on the employer's side is primarily economic and derivatively political, and because inequality in the equation is due to a lack of
economic power on the employee's side, collective rights are those necessary to restore economic equilibrium. "Representatives designed or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees . . . for the purpose of

collective bargaining in respect of pay, wages, hours of employment or
other conditions of employment .

... 109

Thus, as to the affairs of the working place-for that is what the final
clause comes down to-the collective holds all rights primarily, and any
benefits (the claim of Doe to be called or not be called for overtime, or his
claim to X dollars an hour in the future), are obtained by the individual
only derivatively, and not independently or primarily. 110 These collective
rights are exercisable within the constraints of the NLRA by the labor
collectivity, and waivable by it as well. Collective bargaining, remember,
as a form of negotiation inevitably involves waiver, the giving up of this
right to gain that one, perceived to be superior.
Participatory rights, on the other hand, are the liberties of the ancients,
the democratic rights of participation in the formation, administration and
dissolution of the collective. Section 7 of the NLRA, the "rights" provision, guarantees that "[e]mployees shall have the right to form, join, or
assist labor organizations. .

.

. " IIIThese participatory rights are one of

the counterbalances to a system of majority rule; the other will be the
right fairly to be represented (which it is not analytically proper, however, to call a participatory right). Participatory rights, by definition, inhere in the individual, create a duty in both the employer collective and
the employee collective, and are waivable solely by the individual in his
individual capacity. 112 Ideally perhaps, participatory rights should operpie more exactly and intimately grasped as the unexpressed major premise of the half-dozen examples
which mark its extent and its limits than it can be in any abstract form of words?" Holmes, Judge
Holmes' Oration, 3 L.Q. REv. 118, 121-22 (1887).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See note 103 supra (full text of this section).
110. See Part IV-D-2 infra for a more complete discussion of these claims.
111.29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). This section reads:
Employees shall have the ight to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such ight may be affected by a lawful agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment . . ..
112. To say that the right is not waivable by the collective is not to say that it may not be asserted

26
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ate only against the employee collective. This assumes, however, the
preexistence of an effectively functioning collective. The employee's
right to participate in a collective may be threatened either from within,
by the union hierarchy, or from without, by management.
The balance of section 7 assures employees the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing" and "to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . ." Where do these rights fall under
the present system? The first of them creates the right to bargain collectively, which section 9, as we have seen, vests in the collective. Properly
understood, it is only declaratory of the self-evident right of employees
(and that noun may be used collectively) to assert their collective right to
negotiate. Similarly, the second clause just quoted, guaranteeing the right
to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, likewise declares collective rights, for a collective acts only through its members.
There is one section 7 right, added in 1947, the right to refrain from all
activity guaranteed under the section, which at first blush appears wholly
individualistic and out of place in the scheme as drawn. In essence, however, it belongs in the category of participatory rights because (at least in
theory) it is merely individual nonparticipation in collective activity
which is protected: the worker is bound by communal decisions in any
event.
Other participatory rights are assured by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure or Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959113 and its union
member's "Bill of Rights,' and by the democratic representative and adjudicatory provisions of most, if not all, union constitutions. Of greater
practical significance, perhaps, than these participatory rights just mentioned is the firmly established duty of the union fairly to represent all
within its unit, 114 the legally enforceable duty of fair representation,
which harkens back to Constant's warning, lest the union "sell too cheaply individual rights and enjoyments." 115
2.

Participatoryversus individualrights
In a sense, participatory rights are individual rights, as we have just

by the collective on the individual's behalf. Moreover, my theory does not admit lightly of waiver by
individuals. The pressures brought to bear upon the individual to waive his rights are precisely the
unequal pressures which the collective system seeks to redress. See Part IV-C infra.
113. 29U.S.C.§§401-531 (1976).
114. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). A full study of
the duty of fair representation can be found in Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective
Bargaining,64 MINN. L. REv. 183 (1980).
115. B. CONSTANT, supra note 92, at 162 (author's translation).
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seen: they inhere in the individual and are one of the counterbalances to
his being subsumed to the collective. Is there, however, another class of
rights which we have yet to address? This is one of the most troubling
questions in all of labor law, and I cannot presume once and for all to
determine it, when Professors Cox, Feller and Summers have yet to reach
common accord. 116

One could, in pursuit of that architectonic purity earlier foresworn, answer no: that the categories already set out exhaust the universe. Ideally,
perhaps this would be so; but again, we have been warned against the
altar of ideals. In reality, the collective-participatory mechanism as outlined is felt insufficient to protect individual interests. To remedy this felt
need we may rely upon an endogenous mechanism, an internal adjustment to or fine tuning of the system already devised. Such would be the
right fairly to be represented, or correlatively stated, the duty of fair representation on the part of the collective. Or one may employ an exogenous mechanism by creating a genus of individually vested rights which
exists independently of the collective agreement, or perhaps even arises
out of it. For want of better terms I shall call the two species of this latter
mechanism statutorily vested rights and contractually vested rights.
First, there are statutorily imposed ex ante standards fixed upon the
employment relation and generally vested by the statute in the individual: 117 thou shalt have the minimum wage," i8 thou shalt have a safe and
healthful workplace, 19 thou shalt be free of certain forms of discrimination. 120 As to these matters, the collective is normally forbidden to interfere, which is consonant with the notion of a purely individual right; and
in the interest of the employee sought to be protected, these statutorily
vested rights are in most instances not waivable. 121
The question, of course, is why this excresence? Protection of the individual worker is the very stuff of the collective system, indeed its raison
d'etre: if the individual qua individual is unable to secure justifiable aims
due to an imbalance of economic power in relation to the opposing bearer
of power, do we not subsume him to another collective which will have
116.

See Cox, supra note 104; Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgree-

ment, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663 (1973); Summers, supra note 104.
117. There is at least one federally imposed non-negotiable employment standard which may be
viewed as vesting in a collective. See the Service Contract Act of 1965, § 4, 41 U.S.C. § 353(c)
(1976), which guarantees unionized successor employees certain fruits of a predecessor union's contract negotiation efforts.
118. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
119. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1976).
120. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
121. In a sense, of course, virtually any right is "waivable" by nonuse or nonassertion. This is
not what I intend.
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the power? Is the establishment by governmental fiat of individually
vested rights, by what has been called labor standards legislation necessary? Strong arguments can be made that they are indeed superfluous,
where (a) an effective collective has come into being which (b) asserts
traditional economic claims in the areas of wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment. But either condition may, and often does
fail: in some labor markets, the supply of labor is such that it is unlikely
that a collective will be organized, and even if it is, that it will be sufficiently strong to offset employer power. In that case, legislative power is
substituted (itself a species of collective power) to prevent the harsher
effects of the unequal relationship.
Moreover, subsumption of the individual to the collective gains him
nothing as to claims which the collective does not vigorously pursue, either from an historical lack of concern, or even from hostility to the rights
asserted, but which claims the government affirmatively endorses as fundamental. As to the first of these, one may cite by way of example, occupational safety and health; as to the latter, antidiscrimination or perhaps,
pension security. Obviously, too, if the government deems these rights of
fundamental concern to society and the individual, it attempts to establish
a mechanism for their vindication which can operate in the absence of a
collective, that is, on the simple employee-employer relationship. We
shall see shortly that'these employee interests, at least in the context of a
preexisting collective, might be protected otherwise than by government
fiat, that is, by the duty of fair representation. The harder question will be
whether they ought to be.
The idea of a contractually vested right (vested, I mean, in the individual) is again an individualistic notion which implies a need not met by the
proper functioning of the collective system of right-assertion and rightvindication. Since in the United States a collectively bargained agreement
is a legally enforceable contract1 22 (between whom is a subject of some
dispute), the exercise of a collective right (to contract to receive X dollars
per hours worked) may lead to the creation of an individual right: once
Doe works the hour under the agreement, he has an independent and primary right to the dollars, independent of the collective agreement. This
seems clearly to be Professor Summers' view. 123 And Professor Cox
(who I should think would differ substantially with Professor Summers on
this point) has observed that: "[m]anifestly each worker has a strong and
intensely personal interest in his compensation. He did the work. The
122. Contrast the British position set forth in note 89 supra. The legal nature of individually
vested rights is well discussed in the Summers and Cox articles cited in note 104 supra.
123. Summers, supranote 104, at 263-66 &passim.
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money will be his, if recovered. His right is vested in the sense that the
events giving rise to the employer's obligations are past and the claim is
accrued. The law's traditional concern for such rights is testimony to the
24
importance which society accords them." 1
Conceding the traditional concern with such expectations, one has not
answered but merely restated the question:1 25 what should be the mechanism for their recognition? Professor Summers suggests that "[tihe collective agreement creates rights in the individual employee which are enforceable" under the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act permitting suits
for breach of collective agreements. 126 Addressing specifically the problem of a "matured expectation" (the right to overtime pay for work already performed) under a labor agreement, Professor Summers finds that
the expectation of the employees when they ratified the agreement was
that they would receive the benefits promised in the contract, "not something less later deemed adequate by the business agent. Those expectations are rooted in legal rights."127 But is it necessary that this right be
primarily and independently vested in the employee, rather than in the
collective which represents him? This notion of virtually absolute ex post
liability introduces a rigidity into an industrial system of reciprocal giveand-take whose very virtue is its tendency toward conformity with actual
industrial necessity. There are often persuasive reasons why facially legitimate claims of individuals ought not be pursued for reasons of the greater
good of the collective, and it is only as a last resort that we should foreclose that possibility.
The corporate world may offer an analogy in its shareholder's derivative suit. While one recognizes expectations which may naturally arise in
individual shareholders from the dealings of his capital collective with
another capital collective, we do not say that the right to the benefits from
the transaction is his, but only that upon a certain showing that his corporation has acted unreasonably with respect to him or his fellows, he may
assert the right properly held juridically by the corporation, since the latter by its misconduct has shown itself unwilling or unfit to do so. The
employment analogue is, of course, the duty of fair representation.
3.

The duty offair representationin a collective system.
A full treatment of the duty of fair representation is well without the

124. Cox, supra note 104, at 615-16.
125. The device is rhetorical and Professor Cox is not at all guilty of it.
126. Summers, supra note 104, at 256 (emphasis added).
127.

Id. at 264.
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scope of this article. 128 But, as we have seen, it is an alternative to the
vested-rights theory suggested just above. Hence, it is necessary to examine its contours, its role in a collective system, and the manner in
which it functions.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA creates, it has been held, a duty on the part
of the statutory representatives fairly to represent all employees within the
bargaining unit. "It is a principle of general application," the Supreme
Court said in first enunciating the doctrine, "that the exercise of a granted
power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a
duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a
grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those
29
for whom it is exercised unless so expressed." 1
The recognition of this right is a necessary product of a system of collective rights operating within a larger legal, social and political context
which rightfully respects individual expectations. Constant himself saw
collective liberty threatened by its own peculiar danger, "that men might
make individual rights too cheap." 130 That the individual's rights may be
subsumed to the collective may be necessary; that those rights, now held
by the collective may be bartered away, is permitted; but that such collective rights, rights mirroring justifiable individual expectations of individual members, should be frivolously abandoned, is collective liberty degraded to a caricature of itself, to unprincipled majoritarianism or
ochlocracy. Like a governor on an overheating engine, the duty of fair
representation places limits upon the otherwise desirable tendency within
the system to emphasize the collective over the individual. We are not so
unwise as to rely solely upon the ideals of participatory democracy: not in
our political affairs, where we place the due process and equal protection
clauses alongside the right to vote; nor in our business activities, where
we may recur to the derivative suit if our voice through vote unreasonably
is ignored; neither should we in the employment relation, where despite
our participatory rights, we erect the duty of fair represenation.
The duty, as a restraint upon collective action, has the virtue which its
alternative, the individual vested right, does not: it is relatively inobtru128. Indeed, it has been masterfully treated by Professors Summers, Feller and Cox, see note
116 supra, and more recently so, by Professor Finkin, Finkin. The Limits ofMajority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REv. 183 (1980). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 86 at 695-728;
Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phasesof Unionism:Administrative and Judicial Controlof the
Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1435 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protectionfor Critical Job Interests: Union ManagementAuthority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RuT.L. REv. 631

(1959).
129. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192,202 (1944).
130. B. CONSTANT, supra note 92, at 162. The original reads: "qu[e] . . . les hommes ne tissent trop bon march6 des droits et des jouissances individuelles."
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sive in the reciprocal give-and-take of joint industrial management. To be
sure, all ex post mechanisms are designed to have a normative effect felt
ex ante. But while the vested-rights approach establishes a rigid rule, the
duty of fair representation restrains only when it would be unfair not to.
One may well say, as Professor Cox intimates, that in most instances it
will be an easily demonstrable breach of the duty not to pursue an accrued
wage claim on behalf of an individual employee.' 3 1 But in those several
instances in which the collective reasonably and fairly decides that it is in
the best interests of all employees not fully to pursue the expectations of a
single individual, the duty of fair representation allows the adjustment to
be made; and to me, there is value in that.
IV.

THE THEORY APPLIED: THE COLLECTIVE PRINCIPLE
IN THE BOARD AND COURTS

Earlier I put forward a series of actual cases which set off the subtlety
of the system we have been addressing. The resolution by the Board and
courts of these concrete disputes appeared unsatisfactory. I intend now to
re-examine those cases to illustrate the possibilities for analysis and adjudication suggested in the foregoing section.
A.

Employer-Employee Confrontation

Here, two cases-one old, one new-nicely demonstrate the difficulty
adjudicators face in attempting to deal with labor cases much as they
would with tort or criminal cases.
Blue Flash Express, Inc., 132 to refresh your memory, posed the dilemma faced by an employer uncertain whether his employees had unionized or whether their union enjoyed majority status. If the union has attained a majority it is unlawful not to bargain with it. 133 But how does the
employer determine if a union indeed represents a majority, for if it does
not, the employer has no obligation to treat with it? The most obvious
way was simply to ask the individuals whether they had joined the union.
The Board initially held this per se coercive employer conduct, thereby
recognizing explicitly one of the socioeconomic data of labor law: the
justifiability of employees' fear when queried as to union affiliation.

131. This seems to be the purport of Professor Cox's continuum of rights analysis and his corollary "suggestions of principles" and accompanying presumptions developed in Cox, supra note 104.
at 617-18 (1956).
132. 109N.L.R.B.591,34L.R.R.M. 1384(1954).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See also note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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"The finger which espionage might merely direct is actually pointed at
him by the inquiry from his employer. He fears that a refusal to answer or
34
a truthful answer may cost him his job." 1
After Blue Flash such a sensitive accommodation of employee behavior was impossible. There, Golden, the general manager, summoned the
employees, one by one, into his office where each denied that he had
signed up with the union, although in fact, every one of them had done
so." [T]here is no credible evidence that the Respondent at any time had
made any threats. . . , resorted to any reprisals, or exhibited any antiunion animus," wrote the Board. 135 "Although the employees who had
signed union authorization cards gave false answers to Golden's inquiries, the Respondent did nothing to afford them a reasonable basis for
believing that the Respondent might resort to reprisals because of their
36
union membership or activity." 1
By concentrating on individuals, rather than the facts of industrial
power, the majority opinion failed to see the forest for the trees, missing
the whole because it was looking at the part. Why did they all lie? The
dissent bespoke a full awareness of the roles of fear, power and collectives. Observing that in their judgment the majority opinion was unsound
and ignored the realities of industrial life, and that employees can exercise fully their right to engage in or refrain from self-organization only if
they are free from employer prying and investigation, the dissenters continued:
When an employer inquires into organizational activity whether by espionage, surveillance, polling, or direct questioning, he invades the privacy in
which employees are entitled to exercise the rights given them by the Act.
When [the employer]. . . questions an employee about union organization
• . . he forces the employee to take a stand on such issues whether or not
the employee desires to take a position or has had full opportunity to consider the various arguments offered on the subject. And the employer compels the employee to take this stand alone, without the anonymity and sup137
port of group action.

134. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1361, 24 L.R.R.M. 1575, 1576 (1949)
(citing Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner Act, 20 TUL. L. REv. 469, 499
(1946)).
135. 109 N.L.R.B. at 592, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1385 (1954).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 596-97, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1388 (members Murdock and Peterson, dissenting) (emphasis added). The dissenters suggested the correct employer response:
Several approved methods of determining whether a labor organization represents a majority
of his employees are available to an employer. He may ask the labor organization to offer proof
of its majority; he may request the organization to file a petition for a Board determination by
election; or he may file a similar petition himself. He may agree . . . to submit authorization

Washington Law Review

Vol. 56:1, 1980

In sum, the majority opinion looks distressingly like something Lord
Abinger might have written in the nineteenth century. 38 The individual
employee is culled from the mass of his fellows and faced with an ominous question which principles of collective liberty dictate ought not to be
asked, at least not of him. The union's collective ight to speak forindeed in Constant's terms, subjugate-the individual in any affair affecting labor relations is violated. Moreover, the participatory right of selforganization, that is, to bring into being the collective which will be the
individual's sword, and here, his shield, is also impaired.
I said in introducing it that Blue Flash was of waning impact, and that
is as much a statement of fact as of desire, first because much of the sting
was taken out of the decision by the subsequent Struksnes Construction
Co., 139 but more importantly because of the 1974 Linden Lumber 140 decision, squarely placing the onus of proving majority status on unions, by
petitioning for a Board election if necessary, thereby relieving management of the dilemma which created the Blue Flash situation in the first
place. It is the hour to overrule Blue Flash, at least in its cruder forms, 141
for there is now no need for it in union organizational cases and Linden
Lumber can with ease be extended, and should be, to the employer's

doubt as to a continuing majority status after the union's initial certification year. 142 Interrogation in that circumstance is just as coercive as in the
organizational setting and just as inimical to the collective principle. An
cards to an impartial third party for a check. . . . Finally, if an employer has a genuine doubt
as to the labor organization's majority status, he may simply refuse to recognize the organization, and his good-faith doubt is a defense to a charge of a violation of the duty to bargain.
Id. at 600, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1390 (emphasis in original).
138. See note 52 supra.
139. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 65 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1967). The "Struksnes standards" are contained
in the following passage; obviously, number four is the key:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will be violative . . . of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is
to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority. (2) this purpose is communicated to the
employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are given, (4) the employees are polled by secret
ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a
coercive atmosphere.
Id. at 1063, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
140. 419U.S.301,310-11 (1974). See Note, 26MERCERL.REv. 1441 (1975).
141. IfallBlue Flash means now is that in cases not involving systematic polling of several
employees, the Board will
look to "all
of the circumstances" todetermine coercion then itmay be
unobjectionable. See R. GORMAN, supra note 86, at176-77. But see note 143 infra.
142. Whitney's, 81 N.L.R.B. 75, 23 L.R.R.M. 1297 (1949), permits an election insuch a situation although the "good faith doubt" test dealt the death blow in Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419
U.S. 301 (1974), was read into Whitney's by United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 654 n.8,
61 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1966), and criticized by Talent, U.S. Gypsum Company-More of the Same, 17
LAB. L.J. 559 (1966). See also Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954), where the Court. citing
with approval Whitney's, adds in a footnote: "The Board has on several occasions intimated that even
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election is clearly superior, clearly available, and not destructive of im143
portant participatory and collective rights.
Employer-employee confrontation was also involved in NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 144 the case of Leura Collins, accused of stealing $1.95
of fried chicken. I said before that it was but the last act in a drama. The
Supreme Court's appearance, deus ex machina, now seems regrettable.
Its opinion is steeped in individualism. The Court, in what was most
likely a sincerely motivated desire to aid the common worker in accordance with Congress' section 7 mandate, in fact subtly impaired the effective functioning of labor law and labor relations, giving an employee a
"right" as harshly empty as that of Abinger's employee, who could
choose not to work if he pleased. 145
You will recall that Leura Collins was reported to have purchased a
$2.95 box of chicken but to have placed only $1.00 in the till. A store
detective Hardy and the store manager called her in and questioned her,
refusing to call the shop steward she repeatedly requested. They soon
found that she had taken but $1 worth of chicken. Collins, however,
bursting into tears, cried that the only thing she had ever gotten from the
store without paying for it was her free lunch. Assuming "free lunches"
were against company policy, the two managers thereupon closely interrogated her about her alleged violations of the assumed company rule,
while she repeated her request for a shop steward. Her request was denied. In retrospect we know that Collins' perception of the "free lunch"
issue was in fact correct.
Let us for the moment assume that union representation-and here we
are using "representation" in a sense less familiar to labor law, namely,
counsel-at disciplinary interviews is a good thing and one mandated by
the statutory scheme of the NLRA as well as by considerations of the
labor policy of the country. 146 Assume all these things, arguendo, and
after the certification year has passed, the better practice is for an employer with doubts to keep
bargaining and petition the Board for a new election or other relief." Id. at 104 n. 18.
143. Under this analysis, the Board's decision in W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 242
(1972), enfd 486 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1973), is ill-conceived. There, the company and union were
engaged in contract renegotiation, which of course, might or might not lead to a strike. During the
pendency of negotiation, the company added a question to its normal employment application:
"The . . . Company is currently engaged in contract negotiations. In the event of a strike, the plant
may be picketed. Would you be willing, under these conditions, to cross a picket line when entering
or leaving the plant? 486 F.2d at 181 n.2. Both Board and court held the question "restraining or
coercive" in violation of the third Struksnes standard, in that no assurance against reprisal was included. This is, as was Blue Flash, precisely the sort of situation for which the collective system of
liberty is necessary.
144. 420U.S. 251(1975).
145. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
146. Which is not at all obvious, as the courts of appeals were unanimously contrathe Supreme
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then read these short paragraphs earlier quoted from the Supreme Court's
opinion reaffirming the Board's finding:
The Board's construction that § 7 creates a statutory right in an employee to
refuse to submit without union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may result in his discipline was announced in . . . Quality

Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 ...
First, the right inheres in § 7's guarantee of the right of employees to act in
concert for mutual aid and protection ...
Second, the right arises only in situations where the employee requests representation. In other words, the employee may forego his guaranteed right

and, if he prefers, participate in an interview unaccompanied by his union
representative.
Third, the employee's right to request representation as a condition of participation in an interview is limited to situations where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action. 147
All of this is demonstrably wrong if what has gone before is at all correct.
The Court's implication that the right created turns upon the reasonableness of the employee's fear of punishment is inconsistent with the data
and assumptions upon which labor law are based. Without indulging in
undue repetition, have we not yet learned that a fairly high level of employee fear is an inevitable and justifiable adjunct of the employment relation, a relationship between a bearer of power and a non-bearer? The
Court, mirabile dictu, at once rejecting "unreasonable fear" and accepting "reasonable fear," continues: "[a] single employee confronted by
an employer investigating whether certain conduct deserves discipline
may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being
investigated or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors." 148 His fear now
being reasonable rather than unreasonable (however that is to be demonstrated), the employee acquires a section 7 right. The truly marvelous part
of the syllogism, however, is the corollary: this "ignorant," "fearful"
and "inarticulate" employee may intelligently and effectively waive this
49

right. 1

Court decision. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973).
147. 420 U.S. 256-57 (emphasis added except for words "First," "Second," and "Third")
(footnotes omitted).
148. Id. at 262-63.
149. Any analogy to the criminal law precepts of waiver and consent, while of surface appeal
because of the apparent similarity of the factual settings, is nonetheless jurisprudentially inappropriate. The applications of waiver in criminal law are themselves not beyond criticism. See Weinreb.
Generalitiesof the FourthAmendment, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 56-57 (1974). More importantly, one
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What is wrong here? If there is to be the right which we have assumed
there should be, it cannot be the employee's. It must of necessity be a
collective right, assertable and waivable only by the collective authority,
the labor union. The whole point of our labor law is to take the individual
off the front line in labor matters and replace him with the power agglomerate. 150 Moreover, the collective has an intense interest in assuring that
its authority and effectiveness are not being undermined in confrontations between the employer and the employees it exists to protect. The
statutory right which the Board and the Court have labored so mightily to
create in Weingarten is misstated, miscategorized and thus misunderstood: it is not a right of the employee to have the union present, it is the
right of the union to be present. Strangely again, the Court's opinion is
laden with statements emphasizing the communal benefits of the right of
representation, references which are logically harmonizable only with a
collective right. "The union representative whose participation the employee seeks is . . . safeguarding not only the particular employee's interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising
vigilance to make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a
practice of imposing punishment unjustly. The representative's presence
is an assurance to other employees in the bargainig unit that they, too, can
obtain his aid and protection if called upon to attend a like interview." 151
Palpably, the right is a collective one under our scheme of labor rights.
The Court perceived a duty, that employers accede to union representa-

ought not lightly shuttle concepts from area to area of the law. Labor law is an essentially collective
phenomenon, specifically recognizes employee fear as justifiable, and is designed even to prevent the
employee's being put in a position where economic fear may play a role such as this. The criminal
law has none of these characteristics. Moreover, in the criminal law, in theory at least, a heavy
burden of proving guilt is on the state and in abstract terms the individual is presumed innocent; in
ordinary labor law, the employee's "guilt" may be established to whatever degree pleases the employer. Absent contractual considerations, the burden is always on the employee to show why he
should not be dismissed.
150. It is also a trifle troublesome that the Court creates a "right" literally unavailable to most
employees, as only about a quarter of the eligible private sector workforce is unionized. Who will
"represent" the.harassed employee in the non-union shop? This, too, I think points logically to the
collective nature of the right which the Court deems individual. One might say that a non-union
employee in Collins' position, by seeking aid from a co-worker, is seeking to form a collective,
rather than to assert a collective right to mutual aid. But the waiver problem persists even if one does
find a participatory right: if this persecuted employee so needs aid, can she also be said to be able to
waive it? See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
151. 420 U.S. at 260-61 (footnote omitted). The Court even says that the "statutory right confirmed today is in full harmony with actual industrial practice. Many important collective-bargaining
agreements have provisions that accord employees rights of union representation at investigatory interviews." Id. at 267 (footnote omitted). This statement does not at all support the Court's basic
premise: it was the collective representatives who negotiated and established this "actual industrial
practice."
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tion at disciplinary hearings, but in Hohfeldian terms, found the correlative right in the wrong person.
B.

CommunicationalRights

Employees, we saw in Part I, have communicational rights guaranteed
by section 7 of the Act. It remains, however, to be seen, what the nature
of these rights is. The vehicle is NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 152 with whose

facts the reader is already familiar. It presented the refreshing occurrence
of the highest court reflecting upon collective principles in collective
terms. "The sole issue," wrote Justice Douglas for the Court, "concerns
the power of the collective-bargaining representative to waive those
rights." 153 The Court decided that issue in the negative: the union had no
power to waive these section 7 rights, involving only the distribution of
literature, although the ability of a union to waive the right to strike, the
union member's Excalibur, goes unquestioned. 154 The difference in treatment is not lightly to be justified. 155 It is not analytically helpful to say
simply that some rights can be waived and others cannot, that some are
less important than others. I should hazard the guess that most observers
would have said the right to strike is more important to union and member
than the right to handbill on the premises, and yet it is the latter and not
the former which cannot be waived. Is there an analytically sound basis
for this disparity of treatment? I maintain that there is. Simply told, the
section 7 communicatory rights here in play are participatory, not collective, and inhere in the individual: they are part and parcel of the democratic rights of representation and participation which are necessary if the
"liberty of the ancients" is to function in a manner fair to all. It is the first
of the liberties which Constant mentions, the liberty "to deliberate in
public places," just as it is necessary that union members have the right
"to examine the conduct of the affairs of [union] officials .

.

.

,

to ac-

156

cuse them, to condemn or absolve them."
Rights of communication in
the public place of the laborer, his worksite, whether exercised in favor of
152. 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
153. Id. at 325.
154. Id. See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448. 455 (1957); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956); Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1248-49,
53 L.R.R.M. 1242, 1243 (1963).
155. The Court's own reasoning, as the dissent well illustrates, is not persuasive.
156. B. CONSTANT, supra note 92, at 159. The extension of Magnavox in General Motors Corp.
v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1975), makes the point well: the court declared invalid collective bargaining provisions which ban the distribution of intraunion campaign literature concerning
election to union office. Less satisfactory is the Board's position in GTE Lenkurt. Inc., 204
N.L.R.B. 921, 83 L.R.R.M. 1684 (1973), and that of the court of appeals in Diamond Shamrock Co.
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or in opposition to the incumbent authority, 157 are not collective rights
and hence cannot be waived by the union acting in its collective capacity. 158 This right must be preserved to the individual, and not put at the
disposal of the collective, for it was one of Constant's warnings-come
true in Gale Products159 and Magnavox-that the danger exists that the
60
rights of individuals may otherwise be too cheaply sold. 1
C. Employer Responses to ConcertedActivity
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act forbids an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization," 16 1 while section 8(b)(2) establishes a corollary duty in the union to
refrain from causing or attempting to cause an employer to violate
8(a)(3).162 Together, these sections are generally treated as giving rise to
discrimination cases, that is, discrimination against 63 an employee because of his membership in a union or because of his engagement in activity protected under section 7. These provisions, Professor Gorman correctly observes, present "[t]he most vexing problems of statutory
construction" under the Act.164 But what is the nature of the right or
v. NLRB, 443 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1971), treating off-shift employees as strangers or nonemployees for
purposes of gaining access to company property for organizational purposes. This characterization,
of course, triggers the more onerous Babcock & Wilcox showing applicable to nonemployees, NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), rather than the more generous right associated with
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), virtually guaranteeing employee access to
company premises. This dilutes the participatory right of employee democratic communicationwithout a correspondingly great injury to employer rights (both Republic and Babcock balanced these
interests)-and is unwarranted under my analysis.
157. It is here that the partial dissenters part ways with the majority: they would allow an incumbent union to waive its members' right to distribute literature favorable to it. 415 U.S. 327-32.
Under my analysis, this view is erroneous.
158. Under this view of communicational rights as participatory-individual, the Board's recent
decision in Teamsters Local 515 (Roadway Express), 248 N.L.R.B. No. 20, (March 3, 1980), 103
L.R.R.M. 1318, is clearly wrong. There, a Teamster's local had a collective bargaining agreement
allowing it use of a bulletin board in the breakroom for "official union business." Helton, a member
of the Union'as well as of PROD (Professional Drivers Council), a dissident Teamsters organization,
posted there a PROD newsletter critical of the Teamsters' hierarchy. When the job steward removed
it, Helton filed a charge of a union unfair labor practice, which the Board dismissed, overruling its
Administrative Law Judge. Member Jenkins dissented.
159. 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 53 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1963). It was much clearer in Gale Productsthat
the union was attempting by its "waiver" to gag opposition. Id. at 1247, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1243.
160. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
163. Some cases do involve employer discrimination in favor of an employee to encourage union
membership.
164. R. GoRMAN, supranote 86, at 326.
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rights which arise out of these provisions, and are they distinct from section 7 rights?
"Discrimination," says Professor Gorman, can have at least four
meanings. 165 Professor Getman, too, has noted that discrimination in this
context can mean more than one thing.166 Much of the discussion in the
area has centered upon whether antiunion animus is a necessary element
of proof of an offense under 8(a)(3). 167 This, however, leaps over a preliminary inquiry of paramount importance: what interests of the employees are sought to be protected? The now classic statement of the purport
of these anti-discrimination provisions is found in Radio Officers' Union
v. NLRB.1 68 "The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from
their organizational rights. Thus, Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were designed to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be
good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any union
without imperiling their livelihood." This is, then, essentially a mechanism for the protection of the participatory right of employees to form,
join or assist labor organizations or to refrain therefrom. 169 As noted
above,170 these participatory rights, fundamental to the fair and successful operation of a collective system, are (within that system) personal.
This sort of right is at the very heart of our system of industrial bargaining. The Board and the courts, however, have gone further, holding that
measures taken by the employer against employees for having engaged in
concerted activities also fall under this section. This result seems difficult
to justify under the present analysis, unless mere engagement in concerted activity, even concerted economic activity, is equated tautologically with the "assistance" of a labor organization. If this is the case,
then an employer might never take any counteraction, for inevitably the
success of the employer would be the defeat, total or partial, of the union;
and that would discourage union membership. The Supreme Court has
165.

(1) treating employee A different from employee B, even though the difference is war-

ranted by business reasons, such as the skill or length of service of the two employees: (2)
treating employee A different from employee B, when the difference is arbitrary and unwarranted by business reasons but is unrelated to union activity, e.g., the religion or political beliefs

of the two employees; (3) treating employee A different from employee B, when the difference
is related to their union membership or activities: (4) treating employee A different from the way
employee B would be treated were it not for his union membership or activities.
Id. at 327.
166.

Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32

U. CHI. L. REv. 735, 736-38 (1965).
167. See, e.g., R. GORMAN, supra note 86, at 326-38 for an excellent analysis.
168.

347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).

169.

Id. at 40.

170.

See Part III-E-I supra.

171.

NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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eschewed such a view. A ban of that kind of "discrimination" is inconsistent with the "economic battle" theory of its opinions in Insurance
72
Agents 17 1 and American Ship Building.1
The difficulty in determining the nature of the rights created as the correlates of the sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) duties is exposed in a constellation of cases describing the limits of permissible employer response to
concerted employee activity. 173 In large measure this substantive body of
law which developed around the two subsections is unobjectionable, and
provides a reasonable balance between competing forces: an employer
may not discharge its employees for striking, 174 but may replace them for
business reasons, 175 and yet must reinstate them upon certain conditions. 176 In fact, an employer must affirmatively seek out economic strikers who have been legitimately replaced during a strike as positions for
which they are qualified become available. 177 If these results are in fact
correct-and for argument here I concede them to be so-then the
78
Board's opinion in the UnitedAircraft case which I earlier noted,1 must
necessarily be wrong, for there it was held proper for the union, in negotiating in good faith a strike settlement agreement, substantially to curtail
employees' preferential recall rights assured under heretofore unassailed
interpretations of section 8(a)(3). If management may unilaterally preclude reemployment of economic strikers for legitimate and substantial
business reasons, 179 wrote the Board, then certainly such reinstatement
claims may be adjusted by mutual accord of management and the
union. 180
They are in the most favored position to know the business needs of the
employer and the prospects of substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. A union may also by agreement obtain other benefits for employees
172. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). "There is nothing in the Act
which gives employees the right to insist on their contract demands, free from the sort of economic
disadvantage which frequently attends bargaining disputes." Id. at 313.
173. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,
389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 304 U.S. 333 (1938); Laidlaw
Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366,68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enf'd414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969).
174. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48,52 (1972).
175. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333,345 (1938).
176. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956) (upon unconditional request by
an unfair labor practice striker); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375,381 (1967) (upon
request by an economic striker, when a job becomes available).
177. Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366, 1369, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252, 1257 (1968), enfd 414 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
178. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
179. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,34 (1967).
180. 192 N.L.R.B. at 388,77 L.R.R.M. at 1792-93.
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in return for a concession as to a reinstatement cutoff date. So long, therefore, as the period fixed by agreement for the reinstatement of economic
strikers is not unreasonably short, is not intended to be discriminatory, or
misused by either party with the object of accomplishing a discriminatory
objective, was not insisted upon by the employer in order to undermine the
status of the bargaining representative, and was the result of good-faith collective bargaining, the Board ought to accept the agreement of the parties as
effectuating the policies of the Act which . . . includes as a principal objective encouragement of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining as a means of settling labor disputes. 181
If section 8(a)(3) protects only participatory rights, this waiver of them
by the collective is unpardonable. Yet the Board's opinion in United Aircraft does not lack persuasion. One's job is to be immune from his union
membership and his zeal or tepidness for it; but it is not immune to all
consequences flowing from collective activity. 182 Just as it is the collective which may waive the right to strike or preserve the right to call it, 183
and just as it is a collective decision when to end it, so it is the collective
which may determine the terms upon which the employees return to
work.
The difficulty lies in the assumption, firmly grounded in the case law, I
concede, that the right guaranteed is a right of the employee protected
under section 8(a)(3). The error is the inevitable result of confusing the
duties imposed upon employers by sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1).1 84 It is a
failure to examine the nature of the corollary rights, one a participatory
right, the other collective. Many of the cases decided under section
8(a)(3), including Laidlaw,185 which created the preferential recall rights
diluted in United Aircraft, have strayed from the protection of participatory rights, for which section 8(a)(3) clearly was designed. They seek
basically to impose restraints upon the use of economic warfare, 186 and
should more logically be decided under section 8(a)(1) 187 which assures
that unfair advantage shall not be taken of the superior position of one
bearer of power, here management, just as other provisions are designed
181.

Id.

182. See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
183. See note 154 supra.
184. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (1) (1976). Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) are set out at text accompanying note 161 supra, and note 187 infra, respectively.
185.

Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968), enf'd 414 F.2d 99 (7th

Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
186. Professor Gorman has placed his discussion of 8(a)(3) in that section of his book devoted to
The Balance of Economic Weapons. See R. GORMAN, supra note 86, at 296.
187. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1976).
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to curb unfair uses of collective employee power. 188 These are intercollective adjustments, a governmental balancing of power 89 between the
bearers of power to assure that the economic sparring will be Marquis-ofQueensberry, and that each side will have a fighting chance.
The peril in all this is, of course, that individual interests may be
cheapened and lost in the dealings between management and union. A
vigorous enforcement of the duty of fair representation is the counterweight to that. I have no doubt, however, that there may be a class of
employer response which amounts to antiunion discrimination, no matter
in what garb it is paraded, and may properly be treated under section

8(a)(3).
For example, discharge of an unfair-labor-practice striker' 90 may present such a situation. Illicit employer activity may have so threatened or
weakened the collective as to leave employees no alternative but to strike.
With the very existence of the collective now put in question, an employer attempt to replace the strikers may justifiably be seen solely as the
product of his antiunion animus. This violates the employees' participatory rights and must be disallowed. 191 But, in other cases, crippling economic responses are just that: they are a collective uppercut to a collective
jab. If the use of such tactics strikes at the heart of a union's ability to
188. Most notable among such provisions are § 8(b)(4) (secondary boycotts) and § 8(b)(7) (unfair organizational orrecognitional picketing). 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), (7) (1976).
189. There is unfortunately broad language in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300, 317 (1965), that it is not the place of the Board to engage in "balance of power" politics, a
sphere the Court says is exclusively Congress's:
Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party or
the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining power.
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court meant to preclude balancing of power in concreto, that is
between the parties to the case, or in abstracto, between management and unions generally. Professor
Gorman has observed that, despite this language, "balancing of harm" is a common practice. R.
GORMAN, supra note 86, at 338 (1976). Instances of each may be found. Compare NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 376 (1967) (balance of harm between the parties?) with NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (balance of harm between employers and unions generally?). Of
course, it may be argued that any "pure" 8(a)(1) (i.e., non-derivative) violation is necessarily an in
abstractobalancing of power, rights and harms.
190. An employee who strikes not to secure some change in wages, hours or other term or condition of employment, but rather to protest employer conduct in violation of the Act (thus, an employer
unfair labor practice), is called an "unfair-labor-practice striker."
191. Stauffer Chem. Co., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (May 9, 1979), 101 L.R.R.M. 1123, may also
present such a case, although, as Professor Finkin points out, the Board's failure to address at all
United Aircraft is most troublesome. Finkin, supra note 21, at 597 n.32. In Stauffer a strike settlement agreement provided for reinstatement of economic strikers by a certain date, with latecomers
considered as having quit. Anderson, one of the striking employees, appeared at the plant shortly
after the expiration of what Finkin calls the "truncated-Laidlaw" period, and was denied reinstatement, even though she had not been replaced. Under any analysis of Laidlaw-the Board's, the
courts', Finkin's or mine-Stauffer is difficult to justify. If the second element of the Laidlaw right,
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bargain collectively or to engage in concerted activity,

192

it may be

banned by statute, by rule or, (in the Board's case) by adjudication. Much
of the confusion in the cases to which Professors Getman and Gorman
advert 93 is the result of calling up section 8(a)(3) to do service in protection of analytically distinct, collective rights, instead of the participatory
rights for which it was designed.
D.

Labor Standardsand Equal Employment Opportunity
94
This, too, we have seen to be a most troubling area. As noted above,1

labor standards and equal employment legislation reflect a lack of faith in
the collective system's ability to vindicate important social interests. It
seems unlikely that the cumbersome, statutory mechanisms would have
been brought into being otherwise. Passage of the legislation implicitly
asserts that the collective cannot or is unlikely to seek to assure compliance with the fundamental social norms which are embodied in the legis-

lation. One may add the additional ground, that the legislation intends to
assure vindication of rights even where a collective does not exist. It is

where there is a union, which could vindicate the statutory interest, that
creation of these statutorily vested individual rights presents problems.

Some cases will illustrate them.

see note 21 supra, is keyed to replacement, then Laidlaw (and hence UnitedAircraft) is simply inapplicable, as Anderson's position was still available. It falls more neatly (although not precisely) under
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), which guaranteed-under § 8(a)(3)-preferential recall rights to unreplacedeconomic strikers.
Fleenvood Trailer's assumption was that an employer's refusal to reinstate an unreplaced economic striker in the absence of legitimate and substantial business justification is "inherently discriminatory" under 8(a)(3), and there ought be some inquiry as to why Anderson was not offered her
position. Absent such a showing, one may legitimately say that while the settlement agreement did
not violate 8(a)(3), its purposeless application to her of necessity draws into question the very real
possibility that she was victimized solely for her "zeal or tepidness" in the assertion of her § 7 rights,
and was not merely reaping the "consequences flowing from" them. See text accompanying note 182
supra.
192. It may well be that this is the case presented by Laidlaw and United Aircraft. If the Board
views the mere possibility of refusal to offer reinstatement after an economic strike in the Laidlaw
circumstances as creating an unacceptable shift in the "balance of power" it may outlaw it under §
8(a)(1 ), just as Congress has for the union outlawed secondary boycotts under § 8(b)(4). But see note
189 supra. This does not, however, solve the waiver problem. It seems clear that one cannot consent
to a secondary boycott. Perhaps some notion of ordre public is required: these duties to refrain from
conduct deemed impermissibly to affect the balance of power are of a public nature and necessary to
the functioning of the legal microcosm of labor.
193. See notes 164-67 and accompanying text supra.
194. See Section III-E-2 supra.

Theory of Employment Rights
1. Employment discriminationclaims
Harrell Alexander, the black drill operator, was fired. The collective
agreement between his union and Gardner-Denver provided that "there
shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry." 195 Alexander filed a
grievance under the general grievance clause although he later amended it
to assert a claim of racial discrimination. When the arbitrator held for the
company, Alexander filed a private action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,196 alleging that his discharge was a racially discriminatory employment practice. The Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 197 held that Gardner-Denver could not rely in the Title
VII action on the contractual arbitral award.
In allowing Alexander a judicial reinvestigation of the claim he had
twice 1 98 pursued unsuccessfully, the Court squarely addressed the individual-collective distinction. There can be no prospective waiver, it held,
of an employee's Title VII rights, although it conceded that a union may
waive important statutory rights such as the right to strike. 199 The difference, the Court observed, was that "[tlhese rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly
may be exercised or relinquished by the union as collective bargaining
agent to obtain economic benefits for unit members. "200 The Court continued:
Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns
not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities. Title Vil's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices.
Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount
congressional purpose behind Title VII. . . .The actual submission of petitioner's grievance to the arbitration . . .does not alter the situation. 20 1
The language could not be clearer. A statutorily vested individual right
has been created, necessarily reflecting the belief that collective resolu195. Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 39 (1974).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Alexander had filed an administrative charge with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission (which referred it to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) after
his grievance but before the arbitration hearing. 415 U.S. at 42.
197. 415U.S. 36 (1974).
198. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had issued a letter of determination finding no violation of the Act. Id. at 43.
199. Id. at 51 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956)).
200. 415U.S.at5l.
201. Id.at5l-52.
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tion does not, cannot, or may not, adequately protect the indvidual's right
to be free of illicit discrimination. Observe that this determination of inadequacy is made in advance and in general: no inquiry is made here into
the system's actual functioning. Whether the union pursued Alexander's
claim fairly, vigorously, dilatorily or reluctantly has not been investigated. Alexander has not shown that he was unfairly represented. The
right is his, personal, and cognizable in a court of law.
Gardner-Denver is not the last word, however. After Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,20 2 decided
the next term, it appears that while the rights conferred by Title VII are
"absolute," they do not exist in a juridical void; that while they cannot be
"waived," they can be effectively canalized; that while they "can form
no part of the collective-bargaining process," ongoing collective bargaining with respect to them renders the employee subject to discharge should
he assert those rights in a manner deemed inconsistent with the policies of
the National Labor Relations Act. The company and union had signed an
agreement banning racial discrimination; the union was to all appearances
diligently prosecuting complaints of racial discrimination and had formed
a special investigating committee. It had drafted reports on the issue and
called meetings with Emporium, the latter's collective bargaining association, the California Fair Employment Practices Committee and an antipoverty agency. Clearly the eradication of discrimination was de facto a
'part of the collective-bargaining process" at Emporium; yet the Court in
Gardner-Denverhad said just as clearly that it could not be so de jure.
Two employees who refused to take part in the negotiations but who engaged in a consumer picket urging customers not to patronize their employer were fired.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gardner-Denverdoes not prepare one
for the result in Emporium Capwell: the Court, upholding a Board finding
of no employer violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, stated that the employees' argument that their conduct was protected concerted activity under section 7 "confuses the employees' substantive fight to be free of
racial discrimination with the procedures available under the NLRA for
securing these rights .... [T]hey cannot be pursued at the expense of the
orderly collective bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA."203
Contrary to its language in Gardner-Denver,the Court observed that "the
elimination of discrimination and its vestiges is an appropriate subject of
bargaining . . . [for] an employer . . . may have strong and legitimate objections to bargaining on several fronts over the implementation
202.

420 U.S. 50(1975).

203.

415U.S.at69.
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of the right to be free of discrimination ....
",204 Were it not for its racial context, the case would be a relatively simple example of an unauthorized or "wildcat" strike, which, although concededly concerted activity for mutual aid or protection within the language of the statute, loses
its protection since the unauthorized activity undermines the union's status as exclusive representative under section 9(a) and is inconsistent with
"a concept of orderly bargaining premised upon democratic union processes. "205 As Professor Gorman has suggested, this notion has in Emporium Capwell been "endorsed by the Supreme Court in what is its most
severe test. "206 Before attempting to reconcile these cases, however, we
should examine two more.
2.

The wage and hour cases

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 207 assuring a minimum wage and overtime pay to covered workers, provides a facially similar context to the
discrimination cases. As in the racial discrimination cases, two cases decided under this Act seem to reflect divergent philosophies. In Leone v.
Mobil Oil Corp.,208 the collective agreement between Mobil and the Oil
Workers Union made no mention of pay during employee OSHA
"walkarounds. "209 The scope of the grievance and arbitration clause 21 0
was sufficiently broad that an arbitrator might interpret such time spent
"walking around" with the OSHA inspector to be paid time under the
contract. 2 11 The employees chose rather to sue individually under the Fair
Labor Standards Act for pay due them for "hours worked.' 212 The court

204. Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
205. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir. 1969). The Tanner court
also suggested that NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) "at least impl[ied] that
'by joining a union an employee gives up or waives some of his § 7 rights.' " Tanner Motor, 419
F.2d. at 220 (quoting Allis Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 199-200 (Black, J., dissenting)).
206. R. GORMAN, supra note 86, at 308 (1976).
207. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976).
208. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1976) provides: "Subject to regulations issued by the Secretary, a
representative of the employer and a representative authorized by his employees shall be given an
opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his authorized representative during the physical inspection of any workplace ..
" This is the so-called "walkaround" provision of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976).
210. The clause provided: "Disputes as to the interpretation of or an alleged violation of the
application of the terms of this Agreement, or as to working conditions . . . shall be considered a
grievance ..
"Leone, 523 F.2d at 1156 n.3.
211. The court of appeals expressly declined to resolve the issue, as its decision on the requirement of exhaustion rendered it unnecessary. Id. at 1159.
212. Id. at 1155 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (1976)).
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of appeals held that an employee asserting his statutory rights under
FLSA need not exhaust contractual remedies before seeking judicial relief. 213 The Steelworkers Trilogy214 and its application to labor standards disputes notwithstanding, 2 15 the court stated that an employee may
not be denied the statutory relief. 216 Gardner-Denversupplied the "underlying rationale," the court said, 2 17 thus implying some sort of statutorily vested individual right.
We saw in Part II-D, though, that this statutory right appeared to be of
an altogether different dimension in Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service. 218 The employer eliminated two coffee breaks, and the union
grieved under a clause and procedure functionally similar to those in
Leone. After the arbitrator held that the employees were entitled to an
additional half hour pay for the omitted breaks, both company and union
requested a clarification: were the employees to be paid the additional half

hour at straight time or at time and a half for overtime pay? In what the
Court recognized as a compromise, the arbitrator declared only straighttime wages be paid. 2 19 When the affected employees sued under the same
Act involved in Leone for statutory overtime due them for hours over
forty, their suit was held barred by the earlier contractual award. The statutorily vested, nonwaivable right to overtime pay under the Fair Labor

Standards Act, was somehow lost in the contractual process. 220 The employee had in fact been paid one-third less than the Act requires. Can
Gardner-Denverbe reconciled with Emporium Capwell or Leone with

213. 523 F.2d at 1155.
214. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960): United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See text accompanying note 45
supra.
215. 523 F.2d at 1156 (citing Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), which
extended the Steelvorkers Trilogy to safety disputes).
216. The court relied on U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971), where the
Supreme Court held that exhaustion of grievance procedures was not required before a seaman might
sue under 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976), regulating the payment of maritime wages. 523 F.2d at 1157.
217. 523 F.2dat 1159.
218. 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). Accord. Union de Tronquistas, Local 901 v. Flagship Corp., 554 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1977). See notes 48-49 supra.
219. 496 F.2d at 449.
220. It has long been thought that a wage-and-hour claim under the Act could not be prospectively waived, or even compromised by settlement where there is a dispute as to coverage under the
wage-hour laws. See D.A. Schult, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S, 108 (1946). Recently there have been
inroads to the contrary. See Thomas v. Louisiana, 534 F.2d 613, 614 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976) and cases
cited therein.
Needless to say, an employee cannot go to his employer and say "Although my work is covered by
the Act, I waive my right to the minimum wage and shall work for $1.00 an hour." Cf. Wage & Hour
Release No. 4-229 (March 23, 1939).
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Satterwhite, or more provocatively, can they or any of them be reconciled
with the theory of rights here propounded?
3.

A tentative reconciliation

Were one to draw a continuum and place the four principal cases discussed in this subsection upon it, one would be inclined to place GardnerDenver and Leone at one terminus and Emporium Capwell and Satterwhite at the other. But what do these pairs of cases share internally,
what brings them in opposition, and what is the role to which each is
attracted?
Gardner-Denverand Leone share an essentially individualistic orientation, a view not at all to be criticized when the important social values
which undergird the statutes they interpret are considered. Harrell Alexander had an absolute right to a judicial inquiry into his statutory claim.
The term statutorily vested right is, in this context, of my own coining
and it thus scarcely seems fair to criticize it, for as Justice Black wrote,
one can give a doctrine an ugly name to hasten its demise. 22' But one
should recall that even vested rights can be divested: even a vested fee can
be defeasible upon a condition subsequent. 2 2 Perhaps the courts in Satterwhite and Emporium Capwell, while recognizing the right created in
individuals by these social statutes, are groping for that event upon which
the right ceases to be isolated and untouchable, and enters the more fluid
calculus of collective liberty. It is true that Title VII and the Fair Labor
Standards Act evince a disbelief, for one reason or another, in the efficacy
of the collective system: but cannot that system prove itself, show affirmatively that valuable human rights to racial dignity and a decent wage,
as well as more mundane rights under the collective agreements, are respected and vindicated? The two suggested rectifying mechanisms to the
perceived defects in a majoritarian system, ex ante standards giving rise
to vested rights on the one hand, and the duty of fair representation on the
other, may reflect a difference in legal, and necessarily social and economic, maturation between Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Considerations of appropriate wage and hour standards have become intricately and inextricably interwoven into the fabric of industrial relations. Unions show no hostility to them; in fact they are areas of traditional union concern and arbitrators are expert in the resolution of
disputes as to them. Subject to the salutary restraints of a vigorous duty of
fair representation, it may not be at all unjust to say that an employee's
221.
222.

Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372,404 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
My colleague Professor Finkin supplied this useful analogy.
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statutory right merges in the resolution of a corollary claim under the collective agreement, just as collective agreements thirty-five years ago dis223
placed what were until then thought to be vested contract rights.
In questions of race, our past is bitter, as is its fruit. The dimension of
the problem and the nation's profound commitment to its eradication justify a less than perfect system of unitary legislation. The collective system
in the past failed to protect the interests of racial and other minorities; its
democratic, participatory rights similarly availed them nothing. The duty
of fair representation in fact arose in the context of racial discrimination,
and was thought to be the counterbalance which would prevent the
cheapening of individual rights in the interest of an oppressive majority.
But it too failed us. When the individual finds his protection within the
collective system, then there is no need to tinker with it. Where he is
helpless within it, however, then he is as helpless as Abinger's employee; 224 perhaps more so, for he is opposed by two bearers of power. At
that point, the government, through Title VII and similar legislation,
must come to his aid. In the next century, perhaps these concerns, too,
will have entered the fiber of industrial relations. It may be that the expectations of individuals to be free of racial, sexual, ethnic or religious discrimination will become embodied in the custom and morality of the
workplace so that they, too, will be protected by the internal processes of
collective bargaining. At present it seems utopian, but it is a hope worth
nurturing.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are two sorts of conclusions. One is a masquerade, a summary of
what has gone before, only more concisely put. This obviously discourages the reading of the corpus of the work and is a dubious undertaking
for any serious writer. Mine is more simple. The call of this article has
not been to abandon an individualistic mode of legal thinking which has
served us well: where it functions well, it properly belongs. Conceptions
of individual liberty, however, should not be imported in bulk, uncritically, into the law of labor relations. There is indeed room for them there,
but in restrained number; substantial room must be left to principles of
collective right. Moreover, an analysis of rights in the employment relation in collective terms can and does produce solutions "more satisfactory than those which would result without it.' '225
223.
224.

SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332(1944).
See note 52 and accompanying text supra.

225.

Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REv. 663,

664 (1973).

